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I ARTICLES




The advocate-witness rule of professional conduct prohibits
counsel from testifying in the same cases in which they serve as ad-
vocates. Recent codifications of this rule allow attorneys to fill both
roles in extremely limited circumstances.' This Article examines this
rule and its underlying rationales, considers its role in the United
States judicial system, and explores the usefulness of possible
alternatives.
A review of the relatively brief history of the advocate-witness
prohibition is the starting point for this examination of the advocate-
witness rule. The rule is over 150 years old,' but most of the cases
and commentary discussing it originate within the past 30 years.'
The advocate-witness rule's history in the United States centers on
three general codifications of the rule: the Canons of Professional
Ethics;' the Model Code of Professional Responsibility;5 and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
6
* Trial attorney in the United States Army's Contract Appeals Division, Falls Church,
Virginia. B.S. 1979, United States Military Academy; J.D. 1984, Duke Law School; LL.M.
1989, The Judge Advocate General's School. The author wishes to thank Mr. Alan Chute,
Esq. for the assistance he rendered in preparing this Article.
I. See infra notes 46-47, 163 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., infra notes 126-49 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
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Courts and commentators have identified strengths and weak-
nesses of each attempt to reduce the advocate-witness rule to a writ-
ten ethical code. These decisions and analyses are useful not only to
address specific advocate-witness rule issues, but also to raise serious
questions as to any current need for the advocate-witness prohibition
in the American judicial system.7
Scholars, judges, and lawyers have advanced a number of ratio-
nales to support the need for the advocate-witness rule.8 Each ration-
ale has champions and challengers. 9 Some of the problems with the
advocate-witness rule originate from the attempts to codify it. Other
drawbacks existed with the rule's first application and transcend all
attempts to reduce the rule to a written code. Among the problems
inherent in any advocate-witness rule is a conflict with the right to
counsel.'" The rule negatively affects the attorney-client relation-
ship." Moreover, it is often a tactical weapon allowing the opposing'
party to burden the client of the advocate-witness with expense, de-
lay, and inconvenience. 2 Furthermore, the rule lends itself to no ob-
jective test under which courts and attorneys can consistently assess
and anticipate the rule's application. 3 Ultimately, the rule places
courts in the position of enforcing an ethical rule that has no eviden-
tiary counterpart. 4 Consequently, a critical analysis of the benefits
and costs associated with the advocate-witness rule indicates that the
American judicial system does not need the advocate-witness rule as
currently applied:
II. History of the Advocate-Witness Rule
A. The Rule Prior to Codification
1. Origins of the Rule.-Although the American Bar Associa-
tion considers the advocate-witness rule one of "long standing,"' 5
other commentators find the rule to be relatively new." The rule
7. The scope of this analysis is almost exclusively limited to United States federal court
decisions. Each state has a body of law in this area, and this analysis incorporates state court
decisions that add to the analysis.
8. See infra notes 203-359 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., infra notes 204-48 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 366-89 and accompanying text.
II. See infra notes 390-99 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 390-429 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 445-57 and accompanying text.
14. The advocate-witness rule is unlike the lawyer-client privilege, for example, which
has an evidentiary counterpart. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES,
1984, MIL. R. EvID. 502 [hereinafter MIL. R. EvID. 502].
15. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:503 (Apr. 14, 1984).
16. See, e.g., Note, The Advocate-Witness Rule: If Z, Then X, But Why?, 52 N.Y.U. L.
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prohibiting a lawyer from acting as both trial advocate and witness
for his client in the same case first appeared in an 1846 English case,
Stones v. Byron.17 Before Stones, the weight of such testimony was
in question,"8 but courts assessed its admissibility under the same
standards as applied to any other witness's testimony, such as incom-
petency and interest.
In Stones, the judge acknowledged the lack of precedent and
created the rule based on his fear that a lawyer acting as both advo-
cate and witness would confuse the jury. 9 Although six years later a
court sitting en banc overruled Stones,20 the Stones judge had al-
ready sown the seed of the advocate-witness rule in the English
system.2
2. Competency.-Prior to Stones, and for a period of time
subsequent to that case, incompetency sometimes precluded attor-
neys from acting as advocate and witness in the same case.22 The
incompetency originated from the lawyer's involvement in the case.2"
There is no longer any doubt that lawyers are competent to testify
REV. 1365, 1368 (1977) ("[Nlot until the 1800's did anyone question the propriety, standing
alone, of an attorney's testifying on behalf of his client.").
17. 4 Dowl. & L. 393, 75 Rev. Rep. 881 (Q.B. 1946). See also 6 J. WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE, at 773-74 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976) (Dean Wigmore discounts an allegation that the
first instance of such exclusion was in 1535 in Sir Thomas More's Trial, I How. St. Tr. 386
(1535), by explaining that the impropriety by counsel in that case was a violation of the attor-
ney-client privilege and conflict of interest rules, both of which were "illegal and
indefeasible.").
18. Granon v. Hartshorne, 10 F. Cas. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1834) (No. 5689). In Granon the
court had reason to believe lesser credibility was warranted since the attorney who wanted to
testify had tricked an admission from the opposing party. Id. at 966. Even today, a statement
that a lawyer weasels from a lay person might be viewed with suspicion. The court said neither
English nor United States common law made attorneys incompetent. It was merely "a whole-
some rule of practice." Id.
19. Stones v. Byron, 4 Dowl. & L. 393, 394, 75 Rev. R. 881, 882 (Q.B. 1846). The
Stones v. Byron creation of the jury confusion rationale illustrates that courts, even in the
nascency of the advocate-witness rule, felt pressed to identify rationales for excluding other-
wise admissible evidence.
20. Cobbett v. Hudson, I El & BI. 11, 118 Eng. Rep. 341 (Q.B. 1852). The Cobbett
court called the idea of an advocate testifying "not only contrary to good taste and good feel-
ing, but, as it must be revolting to the minds of the jury, it will be generally injurious to those
who attempt it." Id. at 15, 118 Eng. Rep. at 342.
21. The literature is sparse regarding whether other nations have an analogous rule. One
source states that Roman law precluded attorney testimony in civil cases due to lack of credi-
bility because of bias. The source adds that Spanish law follows a similar rule. Comment, The
Attorney as Both Advocate and Witness, 4 CREIGHTON L. REV. 128, 136-37 (1970). See also
Enker, The Rationale of the Rule That Forbids a Lawyer to be Advocate and Witness in the
Same Case, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455, 456 nn.6-7 (1977) (adds the English and Israeli
systems to the list of nations that preclude attorney testimony).
22. See Sutton, The Testifying Advocate, 41 TEX. L. REV. 477, 479 (1963); Wydick,
Trial Counsel as Witness: The Code and the Model Rules, 15 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 651, 653
(1982).
23. Sutton, supra note 22, at 479.
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for their clients. 4 "A lawyer, no less than a vagrant, teenager or
litigant, is a competent witness."25
Closely related to the incompetency issue, and equally inappli-
cable today, is disqualification by interest. Narrower than incompe-
tency, disqualification by interest arose from the advocate-witness's
partisanship for his client.2 6 Since courts no longer reject testimony
of witnesses possessing pecuniary interests in the outcome of the
case, disqualification by interest has "no present significance."27
Only the advocate-witness rule survives as a basis to exclude a wit-
ness's testimony for the sole reason that he is a trial counsel in the
case.
B. Canons of Professional Ethics
The American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics
originated in 190828 and remained the ethical standard for the legal
profession until the advent of the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. 9 Canon 19 articulated the first codification of the advo-
cate-witness rule in the United States:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to
merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an
instrument and the like, he should leave, the trial of the case to
other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a
lawyer should avoid testifying in court [on] behalf of his client."0
Although the language of Canon 19 seems clear, it was not entirely
free of ambiguity. This uncertainty bears review because it was a
harbinger of problems drafters would face as they tried to refine the
rule.
Canon 19 contained an important internal ambiguity.
24. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational, & Athletic Equip.
Corp., 546 F.2d 530, 539 (3d Cir. 1976) ("Of course, such testimony may subject the attorney
to separate disciplinary action."), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977). See also French v. Hall,
119 U.S. 152, 154 (1886) ("There is nothing in the policy of the law, as there is no positive
enactment, which hinders the attorney of a party prosecuting or defending in a civil action
from testifying at the call of his client." The court also stated that the practice "may be
unseemly" and "may very properly be discouraged." The court then added, however, that
"there are cases, also, in which it may be quite important, if not necessary, that the testimony
should be admitted to prevent injustice or to redress wrong.").
25. Sutton, supra note 22, at 478.
26. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 17, at 775.
27. Id.
28. Note, supra note 16, at 1371 (It was over 50 years after Stones v. Byron before the
American Bar Association became "convinced of the incompatibility of the advocate and wit-
ness functions. ... ).
29. Wydick, supra note 22, at 653 n.4.
30. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 19 (1957).
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"Leav[ing] the trial" of the case to others would seem to indicate
that the counsel could remain involved with all nontrial aspects of
the case. On the other hand, "testifying . . .on behalf of the client"
would seem to require the attorney to withdraw completely from rep-
resenting the "client" in any capacity."1 Anything less than complete
withdrawal would continue the attorney-client relationship.
Another point of confusion in Canon 19 is the meaning of
"merely formal matters.""2 The canon used the phrase "attestation
or custody of an instrument and the like." "And the like" is unclear
since the custody of any type of evidence may be an appropriate
subject of a challenge, depending on the circumstances in which it is
offered. For example, the chain of custody might be an important
part of the item's evidentiary value.33
Another significant Canon 19 issue is the distinction between
testifying "for" and "against" the client. Canon 19 addressed coun-
sel testifying "for" his client.3 4 Testifying "against" the client is not
mentioned by Canon 19, but "Canon 6, the general provision on con-
flicts of interest, . . required lawyers to serve their clients with 'un-
divided fidelity' "35 and thus addressed testifying against the client.
Canon 19 appeared over fifty years after the English court in
Stones first raised the possible impropriety of a lawyer serving as
both advocate and witness. Despite its ambiguity, courts rarely ad-
dressed issues involving application of Canon 19. It "was a rule of
professional propriety, not evidence law."3"
As of 1970, when the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
replaced the Canons of Professional Ethics,3" the majority of courts
allowed the defense attorney to call himself as a witness for his client
without requiring withdrawal as counsel.38 Courts avoided strict ap-
plication of this rule in order to avoid penalizing the client, either to
preserve the reputation of the legal profession or to discipline his
31. Note, Legal Ethics-Enforceability of Canon Prohibiting Attorney's Testimony on
Behalf of Client, 33 N.C.L. REv. 296, 298 (1955).
32. See Wydick, supra note 22, at 654.
33. See, e.g., Branom v. Smith Frozen Foods of Idaho, Inc., 83 Idaho 502, 512, 365 P.2d
958, 963-64 (1961) (attorney testifying that a jar of seed peas, which was in his office for
weeks before the trial, was in the same condition at trial as when it left his office is a formal
matter).
34. See supra note 30 and accomp~nying text.
35. Wydick, supra note 22, at 656-57. The conflict in testifying against a client is be-
tween the duty to testify truthfully and loyalty to the client's interests.
36. Id. at 653.
37. Id. at 657.
38. Even though Canon 19 had been in existence for 37 years as of 1945, only 6 states
.gave any substance to the proposition that an attorney should not be both advocate and wit-
ness in the same cause." Comment, supra note 21, at 137.
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1990
attorney.39 Courts applied the rule more strictly to prosecutors.40 As
of 1970, in almost no civil case had federal courts disallowed an at-
torney's testimony on behalf of his client, nor was there any move-
ment in the federal courts to require the attorney to withdraw as
trial attorney prior to giving his testimony."1 Thus, relevant attorney
testimony entered into evidence, and the client's choice of represen-
tation remained largely intact.
C. Model Code of Professional Responsibility
In 1970 the Model Code of Professional Responsibility replaced
the Canons of Professional Ethics.42 The Model Code was to be both
"an inspirational guide to [lawyers] and . . . a basis for disciplinary
action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the required mini-
mum standards."' 3 Unlike Canon 19, which apparently focused on
the trial itself, the Model Code applies the advocate-witness pro-
scription as soon as the attorney first knows, or it becomes obvious,
that either he or a member of his firm ought to be called as a wit-
ness."" The Code is significant because it .is the basis for similar rules
in many states and federal districts." Although the Model Code has
served as the American Bar Association ethical standard for only
twenty years, its impact on the advocate-witness rule has been
profound.
1. The Model Code Provisions.-The two provisions of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility that codify the advocate-
witness rule are Disciplinary Rules (DR) 5-101(B) and 5-102. DR
5-101(B) provides:
A lawyer shall not accept any employment in contemplated
or pending litigation if he knows or it is obvious that he or a
lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness, except that he
may undertake employment and he or a lawyer in his firm may
testify:
39. Id. at 135.
40. Id. Most states allowed the prosecutor to call himself as a witness for the state, but
the trend was to force withdrawal in this situation. Id. For discussion of the continuation of
this disparate treatment of prosecutors and defense counsel, see infra note 268 and accompa-
nying text.
41. Id. at 133.
42. Wydick, supra note 22, at 657.
43. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PREAMBLE AND PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT (1981).
44. Note, supra note 16, at 1373.
45. Brown & Brown, Disqualification of the Testifying Advocate-A Firm Rule?, 57
N.C.L. REV. 597, 598 (1979).
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(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncon-
tested matter.
(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of
formality and there is no reason to believe that substan-
tial evidence will be offered in opposition to the
testimony.
(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature
and value of legal services rendered in the case by the
lawyer or his firm to the client.
(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a sub-
stantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive
value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particu-
lar case."6
DR 5-102 provides:
(A) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or
pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a
lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of
his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial and
his firm, if any, shall not continue representation in the trial,
except that he may continue the representation and he or a law-
yer in his firm may testify in the circumstances enumerated in
DR 5-101(B)(1) through (4).
(B) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or
pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a
lawyer in his firm may be called as a witness other than on be-
half of his client, he may continue the representation until it is
apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his
client .
7
46. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B) (1976).
47. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAl. RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B) (1976). Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, EC's 5-9 and 5-10 also bear on the advocate-witness rule in the
Model Code. EC 5-9 provides:
Occasionally a lawyer is called upon tc decide in a particular case whether he
will be a witness or an advocate. If the lawyer is both counsel and witness he
becomes more easily impeachable for interest and thus may be a less effective
witness. Conversely, the opposing counsel may be handicapped in challenging
the credibility of the lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the
case. An advocate who becomes a witness is in the unseemly and ineffective
position of arguing his own credibility. The roles of an advocate and of a witness
are inconsistent; the function of an advocate is to advance or argue the case of
another, while that of a witness is to state the facts objectively.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-9 (1976). EC 5-10 provides:
Problems incident to the lawyer-witness relationship arise at different stages;
they relate either to whether a lawyer should accept employment or should with-
draw from employment. Regardless of when the problem arises, his decision is to
be governed by the same basic considerations. It is not objectionable for a lawyer
who is a potential witness to be an advocate if it is unlikely that he will be called
as a witness because his testimony would be merely cumulative or if his testi-
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2. Issues in Model Code Format.-The unusual organization
of the Model Code into three separate standards of canons, discipli-
nary rules, and ethical considerations has made uniform implemen-
tation difficult. The disciplinary rules are important because they are
the basis for disciplinary action against an attorney.48 Although the
ethical considerations (EC) are to be a source of inspiration to attor-
neys,49 they can also be a source of confusion. Some ethical consider-
ations restate DR's, some explain DR's, some recommend conduct
beyond DR requirements, and some "go where no DR exists." 5
One peculiar aspect of the Code's treatment of the advocate-
witness rule is that the EC's and DR's appear to have reversed roles.
Usually, the disciplinary rules, as a minimum level of conduct,
should be easier to comply with than the ethical considerations."'
The advocate-witness rule ethical considerations allow for a subjec-
tive assessment of the hardship to the client and the materiality of
the attorney's testimony. This subjective evaluation allows more lee-
way for an advocate to justify testifying than would DR 5-101 and
DR 5-102, which impose an objective standard of "ought to be
called." 52 In the advocate-witness rule situation, a lawyer might
meet the standards in the ethical considerations for remaining on the
case, yet face censure for failing to comply with the applicable disci-
plinary rules. 53 Thus, the Model Code's internal inconsistencies hin-
der its usefulness as a codification of the advocate-witness rule.
3. Model Code Definitional Problems.-As with the Canons
of Professional Ethics, the Model Code advocate-witness rule met
with confusion. Such confusion may be more than an important part
mony would relate only to an uncontested issue. In the exceptional situation
where it will be manifestly unfair to the client for the lawyer to refuse employ-
ment or to withdraw when he will likely be a witness on a contested issue, he
may serve as advocate even though he may be a witness. In making such deci-
sion, he should determine the personal or financial sacrifice of the client that
may result from his refusal of employment or withdrawal therefrom, the materi-
ality of his testimony, and the effectiveness of his representation in view of-his
personal involvement. In weighing these factors, it should be clear that refusal or
withdrawal will impose an unreasonable hardship upon the client before the law-
yer accepts or continues the employment. Where the question arises, doubts
should be resolved in favor of the lawyer testifying and against his becoming or
continuing as an advocate.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-10 (1976).
48. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 600.
49. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
50. Wydick, supra note 22, at 657 n.36.
51. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 601.
52. See infra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
53. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 601 n.18.
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of the history of the rule; it could indicate a lack of clear bases for
the rule. A detailed discussion of the Model Code's advocate-witness
rule provisions serves as both a history and as documentation of the
lack of strong rationales for the rule's existence. A review of the
problems with the Model Code's version of the advocate-witness rule
also leads to a better understanding of what the drafters of the appli-
cable Model Rules of Professional Conduct attempted to achieve in
their version of the rule.
(a) The meaning of "ought to be called. "--One source of confu-
sion is the meaning of the phrase "ought to be called," which ap-
pears in both DR 5-101(B) and DR 5-102(A)."4 Most courts inter-
pret this term restrictively to mean that the lawyer is the only person
available to testify about a crucial fact.5 5 Some courts interpret these
words more broadly to include a lawyer who is only a potential
witness.
56
Courts that narrowly interpret "ought to be called" believe that
an attorney should not be called as a witness for his client when
another source could provide the evidence to the trier of fact.5 7 The
attorney who is also a witness, however, may possess crucial infor-
mation that he must divulge during the trial if the court is to reach a
just result.58 Under this narrow view, if no substitute evidence exists,
the attorney must withdraw and testify.
The other words located nearby the phrase "ought to be called"
in the DR's do not clarify that phrase. When courts interpret this
phrase narrowly, the word "knows," which precedes it in the Model
Code, is superfluous, and may actually encourage "improper indeci-
siveness."59 A subjective, "knowing" approach makes enforcement
difficult6" and adds little to the rule."
A broad interpretation of the phrase "ought to be called" is
much more troublesome for the potential attorney-witness who
wishes to remain as trial counsel. Applying the advocate-witness rule
to those who are only potential witnesses increases the exposure of
54, See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text; Wydick, supra note 22, at 666 (A
split of authority exists as to the meaning of the phrase.).
55, See Davis v. Stamler, 494 F. Supp. 339, 341-43 (D. N.J. 1980).
56, See Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
57. See Davis v. Stamler, 494 F. Supp. 339, 342 (D. N.J. 1980).
58. See. e.g., Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 836 F.2d 1332, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
59. Sutton, supra note 22, at 489.
60. Id.
61. It adds little to the rule because any lawyer called to account for allegedly violating
the advocate-witness rule would never allow himself to admit he "knew" he would testify.
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1990
the advocate to a disqualification or an ethical violation.62 For exam-
ple, this broad interpretation of "ought to be called" led to disqualifi-
cation of an attorney merely because he attended negotiations rele-
vant to the litigation, even though the principals in the case were
also present and able to testify.63 One court went further: "[The at-
torney] ought to testify even if his testimony only corroborates the
deposition testimony of [his client]."' Such a broad interpretation
encourages abuse of the advocate-witness rule. For example, an at-
torney could employ the rule as a tactical measure to "disrupt an
opposing party's preparation for litigation."65
This uncertainty associated with the phrase "ought to be called"
may yield strange results. It "implies that in some instances [the
lawyer] would be disqualified when [he] ought to testify, even if it
were clear that [he] would not testify, and, conversely, that [a law-
yer] would not be disqualified when [he] would in fact testify even
though he ought not."66
The final issue raised by the phrase "ought to be called" is how
a judge should determine who falls within its purview. One court
stated "that the lawyer and his client decide that the lawyer need
not testify is not controlling. Instead, the court must independently
assess the situation. 6 7 If judges interpret "ought to be called"
broadly, they substitute their assessment of the value of the attor-
ney's testimony for the judgment of the lawyer and the client. One
proposed solution would leave the decision to the trial counsel and
his client, who could "avoid the ethical question entirely" by not
calling the attorney as a witness.6 8
This suggestion has merit. The court is not in the same position
as the advocate. The judge does not know as much about the case as
the lawyer knows. The judge does not have privileged communica-
62. See, e.g., United States v. Siegner, 498 F. Supp. 282, 285 (E.D. Pa. 1980). This
Siegner court was troubled because the potential testimony by the attorney was against his
client. Perhaps that potential conflict prompted the court to set a very low threshold for dis-
qualification. The court stated that "[wihile it is not clear to us whether or not the [attorney]
actually has such knowledge, the [opposing counsel] believes he does .... " Id. at 286.
63. United States ex rel. Sheldon Elec. Co., Inc. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing
Co., Inc., 423 F. Supp. 486, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
64. Kalmanovitz v. G. Heilman Brewing Co., 610 F. Supp. 1319, 1325 (D. Del. 1985),
afid, 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985).
65. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:507 (Apr. 14, 1984).
66. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 602. Under this hypothetical, it is presumed that
this second lawyer did not fall within the purview of the provision disqualifying the attorney
who "knows" he will testify. Otherwise, the Model Code would probably have disqualified him
whether he ought to testify or not.
67. Kalmanovitz, 610 F. Supp. at 1325.
68. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 603.
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tion with the client. Moreover, court selection of witnesses is diffi-
cult. Advocate testimony might appear helpful and relevant to the
client's case, but it might hurt the case in other ways of which the
judge cannot be aware. 9
The terms "ought to be called" and "knows" fail to clearly de-
fine when the advocate-witness rule applies. The subjective standard
is too easy for an imaginative attorney to circumvent. Also, the ob-
jective standard is difficult to clarify and places the court in an awk-
ward position of determining what witnesses the client should or
should not call. Finally, who "ought" or "ought not" to testify may
not align precisely with whom the client and his attorney actually
call as witnesses. Such a decision is fundamentally one of trial tac-
tics, and is best reserved to the lawyer and his client.
(b) The meaning of "prejudicial to his client."-DR 5-102(B)
allows a lawyer who has already accepted employment to continue
representation "until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be
prejudicial to his client." ' When a lawyer discovers that he must
offer testimony that harms the client, the potential advocate-witness
must withdraw immediately. The code provision is clear on its face,
and is particularly important due to the increased detrimental effect
an attorney's adverse testimony may have upon the trier of fact's
perception of his client.71
The words "prejudicial to his client" are not as straightforward
as they appear. Professor Wydick defined prejudicial as "sufficiently
adverse to the factual assertions or account of events offered on be-
half of the client, such that the bar or the client might have an inter-
est in the lawyer's independence in discrediting that testimony. '"72
This definition allows the adverse advocate-witness to remain as
counsel and also testify contrary to his client's interests. An attorney
could attempt to avoid withdrawal by claiming that the substance of
his testimony would not warrant his independent cross-examination.
Professor Wydick's interpretation avoids some of the danger of
withdrawal that could be forced by opposing counsel including the
advocate on his witness list." Defining the term "prejudicial to his
client" as tantamount to a conflict of interest, however, removes the
69. Id.
70. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(B) (1976). See supra
note 47 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
72. Wydick, supra note 22, at 689 n.198.
73. Id. at 689 n.199.
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need for the term at all. Such testimony would fall under conflict of
interest prohibitions, which include a client waiver provision."4 The
phrase "prejudicial to his client" adds nothing to the conflict of in-
terest analysis-and forecloses the client's option of consenting to this
conflict of interest.
(c) Meaning of "nature and value of legal services."-DR 5-
101(B)(3) provides an exception to the general advocate-witness pro-
hibition when the attorney's testimony relates "solely to the nature
and value of legal services rendered in the case."75 One application
of this exception is to assist the court in determining the amount of
attorney's fees when they form part of the judgment in a case.76
Though this purpose is part of the rule, the prospect of the lawyer
testifying for his own financial gain runs contrary to several of the
strongest reasons supporting the advocate-witness rule's existence
since it is extremely prejudicial to the opposing party.77 If ever an
advocate-witness is exposed to allegations of bias, testifying for his
fee is such a time.78 The public's perception of the legal profession
could certainly suffer when lawyers testify in court to justify the
large fees incurred by their clients.79 All of the rationales contending
that the advocate-witness rule supports a just judicial system would
apply in the fee testimony situation, if they apply at all. 80 Yet the
only reason for this exception is to avoid wasting the court's time
and the opponent's money to require the client to retain a new attor-
ney to litigate the fee of the first attorney.81
An economy of time and money basis for this DR 5-101 excep-
tion is completely at odds with the majority of courts, which inter-
prets saving resources of the advocate-witness's client as no reason
for the "substantial hardship" exception to the advocate-witness
rule.8" This absence of internal consistency among the Model Code
exceptions for the rule explains some of the changes instituted by the
Model Rules.
Not every court agrees that "nature and value of legal services"
means only the question of a fair fee. An example of a court
74. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1980).
75. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
76. Wydick, supra note 22, at 670-71.
77. See infra notes 249-66 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 293-96 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 322-58 and accompanying text.
81. Wydick; supra note 22, at 671.
82. See infra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
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uniquely interpreting this exception to the advocate-witness rule to
reach a just and logical result occurred in United States v. Baca.8"
In Baca the defense counsel wanted to testify as to his client's com-
petency to stand trial. The court stated that "[the client's] lack of
memory of the incident in his discussions with [his defense counsel],
his lack of retention of [his defense counsel's] legal advice and in-
structions for more than a short time, and [his defense counsel's]
resulting difficulty in representing his client adequately all directly
relate to 'the nature and value of legal services.' "84 The Baca court's
use of this novel approach to circumvent application of the advocate-
witness rule suggests some inherent problems with the rule.
(d) Meaning of "matter of formality" and "uncontested. "--The
Model Code provides three additional exceptions to the advocate-
witness rule-"uncontested matters,"85 "matters of formality,"8  and
"substantial hardship on the client."87 Though the American Bar
Association anticipated that the exceptions for formal and uncon-
tested matters "will usually be easily identifiable and not present a
difficult problem,"88 such harmony did not emerge.
When applying Canon 19 of the American Bar Association Ca-
nons of Professional Ethics, courts split over the meaning of "merely
formal matters."88 Furthermore, courts have not defined what is a
purely formal matter under the Model Code.90 One commentator
contended that receipt of a letter is "definitely formal."' A court
reached the opposite result regarding the contents of a lawyer's
briefcase because the testimony was subject to attack based on
credibility. 2
83. 27 M.J. 110 (C.M.A. 1988).
84. Id. at 116. The court said, "This language might be read as focusing on the subject
of the lawyer's fee; but it is not necessarily so limited." Id. at 116 n.6.
85. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-10](B)(1) (1976).
86. Id. at DR 5-101(B)(2).
87. Id. at DR 5-101(B)(4).
88. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 339, at 2
(1975). ABA Formal Opinion 339 states, "Circumstances within exceptions (1) through (3)
will usually be easily identifiable and should not present a difficult problem." Exception (3) is
for testimony relating to the "nature and value of legal services." Exceptions (I) and (2) deal
with "uncontested" and "formal" matters, respectively. Although exception (3) has generated
little discussion in the advocate-witness rule literature, the first two exceptions provide a fertile
ground for confusion. Id. at 2. See Wydick, supra note 22, at 669 ("There is scant authority to
explain how [formality and uncontested] differ, if they do."). This Article jointly addresses the
exceptions for uncontested and formal matters.
89. Wydick, supra note 22, at 654; supra note 30 and accompanying text.
90. Comment, supra note 21, at 142-43.
91. Note, Disqualification of Counsel Under the Advocate-Witness Rule: Fair or Fu-
tile?, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 794, 804 (1979).
92. Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp.
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The relevance of credibility cannot be the determinative factor
if the formality and uncontested issue exceptions are to have any
value. Every witness's testimony is subject to a credibility attack.93
Even if the testimony is true to the best of the witness's knowledge, a
myriad of other factors, such as bias, inexperience, and physical
handicap, may erode the witness's credibility. "[If an attack for
credibility suffices to remove the testimony from the purview of the
[formal matters] exception, the exception is meaningless."9 '
This credibility approach to defining "matters of formality" or
''uncontested" closely parallels the attempt to define matters falling
within these exceptions as "uncontroverted." 95 Uncontroverted
means an "absence of directly contradictory evidence"' 6 that is "well
supported by the surrounding circumstances." 7 The problem with
such a definition of "uncontroverted" is that a mere objection would
seem sufficient to withdraw a matter from the exceptions to the ad-
vocate-witness rule. 8 As with the "credibility" analysis, applying the
"uncontroverted" approach would swallow the exception.
Another approach to applying the "matters of formality" and
"uncontested" exceptions is to examine the importance of the testi-
mony to the client's case. If the testimony is not vital to the case,
then the testimony may fall within the exceptions.99 Like "credibil-
ity" and "uncontroverted," "materiality" should not be decisive.
"[R]are indeed is the need for immaterial evidence .... ,100
One final proposal to circumvent these exceptions is to use
"modern procedural devices such as stipulations, admissions, and
pre-trial conferences" to obviate the need for testimonial proof."'
The author of this approach argues that the "ultimate determination
lies with the trial judge." 102 Such judicial discretion implies that the
1064, 1068 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (contents of the lawyer's briefcase at the time his client alleged
readiness to close a deal could have tended to prove that readiness).
93. One exception is those items eligible for judicial notice. For examples of a judicial
notice rule, see MIL. R. EvD. 201; FED. R. EVID. 201.
94. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 606.
95. Comment, supra note 21, at 143 ("[Defining a purely formal matter as an uncon-
troverted subject provides a fairly workable solution.").
96. Sutton, supra note 22, at 491.
97. Id. at 492. See also Wydick, supra note 22, at 670 ("[Elither or both of the excep-
tions ought to allow the testimony unless there is reason to doubt its accuracy and
credibility.").
98. Comment, supra note 21, at 143.
99. Note, The Ethical Propriety of an Attorney's Testifying in Behalf of His Own Cli-
ent, 38 IowA L. REV. 139, 144 (1952).
100. Sutton, supra note 22, at 492.
101. Comment, The Rule Prohibiting an Attorney from Testifying at a Client's Trial:
An Ethical Paradox, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 268, 272 (1976).
102. Id.
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trial judge has the power to order parties to enter into testimonial
substitutes. Although judges do not have such broad power, they can
exert enormous pressure on a party who refuses to accept a reasona-
ble alternative to the advocate-witness's live testimony. Such an or-
der would "apply" the mere formality and uncontested exceptions by
eliminating the need for testimony on the matter. Unless judges ac-
quire this authority, their rulings cannot replace the role of these
exceptions to the advocate-witness rule.
(e) The meaning of "withdraw. "-Another issue in the Model
Code version of the advocate-witness rule is the meaning of "with-
draw." DR 5-102(A) states that "[the attorney] shall withdraw from
the conduct of the trial," ' and EC 5-10 states that an attorney may
elect to "refuse employment or to withdraw.''" The Model Code
does not define "withdraw." It could mean withdrawal from the ac-
tual trial or from the representation. It could mean withdraw imme-
diately or before the time to testify actually arises. The meaning re-
mains uncertain because courts ordering withdrawal rarely address
these issues." 8 When these scope and timing issues of withdrawal do
arise, courts and commentators do not agree on the appropriate
resolution.
Some state that the withdrawal should be complete-a clean
break between attorney and client.'06 The Court of Military Appeals
came to the opposite conclusion in United States v. Baca.10 7 The
trial judge in Baca disqualified the lead defense counsel and barred
him from the courtroom, but explicitly allowed the defense attorney
to assist replacement counsel in her trial preparation. 08 The appeals
court would have preferred to have allowed the defense Counsel to
affirmatively continue on the case, and found it "unfortunate" that
defense counsel was banned from the courtroom. 0
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the
Court of Military Appeals on the importance of the counsel presence
103. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 47.
105. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 608.
106. See, e.g., Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 608 ("[W]hatever benefit there is in
strict enforcement of the rule may be undermined by the continued involvement of a disquali-
fied [attorney] in the affairs of the client.").
107. 27 M.J. 110 (C.M.A. 1988).
108. Id. at 114. "Unfortunately here, the military judge's disqualification of [the defense
counsel] and his ban of [counsel] from the courtroom-rather than promoting justice at
trial-deprived [the defendant] of a most cherished right to the continued representation of his
lawyer of 5 months." Id. at 115-16.
109. Id. at 115.
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at trial versus counsel's preparation of the case. In United States v.
Cunningham"' the court stated that the right of a defendant to be
represented by the counsel he retained is a "right of constitutional
dimension." ' In spite of this strong language, the court concluded
that it is more significant to deprive a client of an attorney in the
preparation phase of his case than in the trial phase." 2
The definition of withdrawal is important because it can affect
the cost and quality of the first trial counsel's replacement.11 3 The
longer the original counsel can remain on the case the more likely
replacement counsel will be unnecessary due to a pretrial resolution.
If trial occurs, the greater role of the first counsel could simplify and
reduce the expense of locating a new attorney. All phases of trial
practice are important, and it is a mistake to rationalize an applica-
tion of the advocate-witness rule by stating that pretrial activity is
most important. The Court of Military Appeals' approach is the best
of the divergent applications of the Model Code's withdrawal
provisions.
Distinct from withdrawal is the timing of the withdrawal. The
Model Code is clear, though complicated, on the timing issue. In the
Model Code's version of the advocate-witness rule, timing is irrele-
vant when the testimony is for the client. The trial counsel must
withdraw unless the nature of the testimony somehow falls within
one of the four exceptions." 4 Only when the testimony is prejudicial
to the client is the time of the discovery of the need for, and the
nature of, the testimony relevant.1 5
Existing judicial and evidentiary remedies could yield a just re-
sult, tailored to the specific facts of the case at hand, without an
application of the advocate-witness rule to direct withdrawal. A
judge has a responsibility to raise any matter necessary to promote
justice during a trial. 16 If a trial attorney harmed his client by re-
maining on the case, and if such harm rendered that counsel's per-
formance ineffective, the trial judge could order the counsel to take
appropriate steps to correct the deficiency. 7 For example, the judge
could order the trial counsel to use an assistant counsel for the direct
110. 672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
111. Id. at 1070.
112. Id. at 1074.
113. See infra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
114. See Culebras Enters. Corp. v. Rivera-Rios, 846 F.2d 94, 98 (Ist Cir. 1988) (The
Model Rules are "less restrictive" since Rule 3.7 speaks in terms of the "advocate at trial.").
115. Wydick, supra note 22, at 659.
116. See United States v. Hanson, 24 M.J. 377, 379 (C.M.A. 1987).
117. Id. at 379-80.
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examination of the lead counsel. 1 ' If the opposing party was harmed
by trial counsel remaining on the case, the judge could grant relief
based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The prejudicial impact of
the attorney's testimony could substantially and unfairly outweigh
any probative effect the testimony might have." 9 Withdrawal is a
powerful measure, but judges' supervisory power and the evidentiary
rules render it unnecessary.
(f) Meaning of "trial."-What constitutes the meaning of
"trial" as used in the Model Code is uncertain. DR 5-102(A) speaks
in terms of withdrawing "from the conduct of the trial" and "repre-
sentation in the trial."' 20 As of 1979 no case had defined "trial" or
what constituted trial testimony. 2 One court said the pretrial hear-
ing in a criminal case was not a trial.'22 Another court found that
the Model Code advocate-witness rule applied to a grand jury pro-
ceeding.' 2 Motions for summary judgment have been found to be
pretrial. 2 4 Unless the testimony of the advocate-witness is clearly
part of the merits of the case, whether such testimony falls under the
Model Code's version of the advocate-witness rule remains
uncertain.
Combined with the cloudy withdrawal picture, the lack of a
clear definition of "trial" for the purposes of the advocate-witness
rule is another strong example of confusion due to unclear code pro-
visions. Perhaps this lack of clarity flows from the lack of definitive
purposes for the advocate-witness rule itself.'25
(g) Meaning of "substantial hardship."-Of all of the Model
Code terms that generate confusion, inefficiency, and seemingly less-
than-perfect results, the phrase "substantial hardship" in DR 5-
101(B)(4) heads the list. "Although the [American] Bar Association
118. Id.
119. FED. R. EVID. 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE RULE 403 (1977).
120. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
121. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 602 n.24.
122. See People v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. App. 3d 491, 502, 148 Cal. Rtpr. 704, 711
(1978).
123. United States v. Treadway, 445 F. Supp. 959, 960-61 (N.D. Tex. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980).
124. MacArthur v. Bank of N.Y., 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court
did not require disqualilication before proceeding with a summary judgment motion because
no witnesses' affidavits were a part of the motion).
125. See infra notes 203-359 and accompanying text.
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has attempted to define this standard more clearly, the attempts
have not been very successful."' 26
The majority of courts apply the "substantial hardship" excep-
tion so narrowly as to render it devoid of any real benefit to its in-
tended beneficiary, the client." 7 A second group of courts grant the
client some benefit of the substantial hardship exception up to the
point of trial. 2 8 If the issue still exists at that time, then these
courts, too, become inflexible.'2 9 The tragedy of these harsh, narrow
interpretations of the substantial hardship exception to the rule is
that they strip the client of the one Model Code provision accruing
directly to his benefit.13 When courts apply this exception narrowly,
the client loses his one chance to escape a costly and possibly unnec-
essary application of the rule.
An example of the almost abusive fashion in which the majority
of courts deprive clients of their attorneys by not granting this ex-
ception best illustrates its scope. In an Oregon case, the disqualified
defense attorney's reputation as "one of the best local trial lawyers
in defending driving-under-the-influence cases" was not enough to
trigger substantial hardship.' 3' If it were, then "an outstanding trial
lawyer in any given universe of trial practice would be free to testify
in his client's case.' 32 In this same case, the client, who was "trau-
matized by her arrest," faced a six month wait before her trial com-
menced, apparently because she had to obtain a new attorney and
court date.13 3 Even after adding this hardship to the attorney's quali-
fications, the circumstances did not reach the level to trigger the ex-
ception.3 Such a decision is not unusual. "[Flew courts give the
adverse consequences more than passing notice, typically observing
126. Note, supra note 91, at 805.
127. Note, supra note 16, at 1375 (The "most widespread ...literalist approach ...
demands an exceedingly high, probably impossible, and certainly inordinate showing of hard-
ship before an exception can be triggered ...and often produces unfair results."). See also
Note, supra note 91, at 807 ("Also, the courts have narrowly construed the 'substantial hard-
ship' exception, causing the rule to be applied to situations in which its purposes are de-
feated."); Cramer, Policing Conflicts of Interest, 1980 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 823, 825 (1980)
("[T]he trend is to interpret the exception narrowly. ... )
128. This approach is analogous to the issue of the appropriate timing and meaning of
withdrawal. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
129. Note, supra note 16, at 1377-78.
130. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 606 ("Since the client cannot by choice or
waiver avoid the imposition of the rule, [this exception] is the only aspect of the rule that runs
directly in the client's favor.").
131. In re Conduct of Lathen, 294 Or. 157, 164, 654 P.2d 1110, 1113 (1982).




that the availability of other lawyers precludes genuine hardship. ' 1""1
. Apparently, the only reported case giving conclusive weight to
the important bond of the attorney-client relationship is United
States v. Baca. 3 ' The Court of Military Appeals stated, "Defense
counsel are not fungible. Although the accused is not fully and abso-
lutely entitled to counsel of choice, he is absolutely entitled to retain
an established relationship with the counsel in the absence of demon-
strated good cause.""3 7 Thus, the Court of Military Appeals en-
dorsed a more accommodating approach to the substantial hardship
exception than have other courts. It placed the burden on the oppos-
ing party to demonstrate the harm that would befall his cause or the
system before it would foreclose that exception to the defendant who
desired to retain his testifying counsel.1"'
Just as with the attorney-client relationship, "the expense and
delay routinely incident to disqualification" a1 3  do not satisfy the sub-
stantial hardship exception in the majority of courts. 140 If these con-
siderations did meet the threshold requirements for the exception,
then "that exception would soon swallow the rule."' 4 Perhaps this
strict approach to financial hardship finds its genesis in the United
States Supreme Court's observation in Cobbledick v. United
States 42 that "[b]earing the discomfiture and cost of a prosecution
for crime even by an innocent person is one of the painful obligations
of citizenship.'
143
Arguably, the ultimate example of this rigid, narrow interpreta-
135. Note, supra note 16, at 1375. The Note discusses five cases with a "client-oriented
interpretation of the . . . rule." Id. at 1379-84. "Of course, none of the ... decisions held the
[advocate-witness] rule inapplicable, but each of the courts evidenced sympathy for the client's
position in the advocate-witness situation and employed the substantial hardship exception to
safeguard it." Id. at 1383.
136. United States v, Baca, 27 M.J. I 10 (C.M.A. 1988).
137. Id. at 119.
138. See Note, supra note 16, at 1384 (in the five cases mentioned supra note 135,
"[m]ost interestingly, the courts seemed to shift the presumption against the testifying advo-
cate . . . so that the burden would rest with the adversary claiming prejudice.").
139. MacArthur v. Bank of N.Y., 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
140. See, e.g., Kalmanovitz v. G. Heilman Brewing Co., 610 F. Supp. 1319, 1326 (D.
Del. 1985) (The mere fact that an attorney has spent great time and resources does not equal
substantial hardship, nor does the delay associated with obtaining a new attorney.), affd, 769
F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985); Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350, 361 (N.D. III. 1984)
("[A] lawyer's long standing relationship with a client, involvement with the litigation from its
inception, or financial hardship to the client are [not] sufficient reasons to invoke the 'substan-
tial' hardship exception to the advocate-witness rule."), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 985
(7th Cir. 1988); Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 573 F. Supp. 963, 966 (W.D. Pa.
1983) (delay to accommodate a new attorney is not substantial hardship).
141. MacArthur, 524 F. Supp. at 1210.
142. 309 U.S. 323 (1940). This case did not discuss the advocate-witness rule.
143. Id. at 325.
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tion of the substantial hardship exception occurred in United States
ex rel. Sheldon Electric Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing
CO."" In that case, the plaintiff's counsel had a ten year relationship
with the client, and his firm had devoted 450 hours in preparing the
case. 145 The defendant had delayed its motion to disqualify the
plaintiff's counsel until the day of trial.'46 The court pronounced the
record "devoid of any indication of [counsel's] particular value to the
plaintiff,' ' 4 7 and disqualified the attorney and his firm, stating that
"the court cannot act contrary to [the public] interest by permitting
a party's delay in moving for disqualification to justify the continu-
ance of a breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility.'
' 48
The courts, however, overlook an important consideration. The
client may not obtain quality replacement counsel because the out-
standing bills owed his initial attorney would consume much of any
contingent fee the second firm could hope to obtain.'49 The useful-
ness of this exception is further decreased because the majority of
courts refuse to consider expense and delay as factors in the substan-
tial hardship equation.
(h) Meaning of "distinctive value."-The substantial hardship
exception itself contains another term that suffers from imprecision.
The term is "distinctive value," as used in DR 5-101(B)(4): disquali-
fication "would work a substantial hardship on the client because of
the distinctive value of the lawyer."' 50
One interpretation of "distinctive value" is that the lawyer must
have such value before accepting the client's case. 15  "As a conse-
quence, the client is not protected against losing the investment he
has made in his counsel, except in the rare circumstance in which
the firm was uniquely qualified to represent the client before it was
144. 423 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
145. Id. at 490.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Emle Indus., Inc. v. Pantatex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 574 (2d Cir. 1973)).
149. Sutton, supra note 22, at 494 n.61. In a noncontingent fee case, the money spent on
the first lawyer could exhaust the client's ability to retain a second quality counsel. No court
has yet addressed this issue.
150. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
151. United States v. Peng, 602 F. Supp. 298, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("That [the attor-
ney] has prepared extensively for trial does not make his services distinctly valuable within the
meaning of [the] rule."), affd, 766 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Jones v. City of Chicago,
610 F. Supp. 350, 361 (N.D. I11. 1984) (A lawyer and his client cannot increase their relation-
ship hoping to rise to the level of substantial hardship when they knew in advance of the
advocate-witness issue), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988); Brown &
Brown, supra note 45, at 607.
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hired." 152 Such an interpretation of distinctive value is inconsistent
with American Bar Association Formal Opinion 339, which lists
three examples potentially satisfying this exception to the rule: a
long and complex suit in which the lawyer's testimony is unantici-
pated; an extended attorney-client relationship giving the lawyer un-
usual familiarity with the client's affairs; and a lawyer testifying
about juror misconduct. 53 These three circumstances clearly con-
template distinctive value arising after the litigation commences.
Such an interpretation of "distinctive value" is the only meaningful
one.
Perhaps this problem in interpreting the distinctive value word-
ing of the substantial hardship exception, and therefore the exception
itself, originates in the possible inconsistency between the wording of
DR 5-101(B)(4), the "substantial hardship" exception, and its un-
derlying EC 5-10 provision. EC 5-10 states that factors to be consid-
ered in determining when "it will be manifestly unfair to the client
for the lawyer to refuse employment or to withdraw" include the
client's "personal financial sacrifice," the "materiality of [the law-
yer's] testimony," and "the effectiveness of [the lawyer's] represen-
tation in view of his personal involvement."' 54 "This language, unlike
that of DR 5-101(B), seems to encompass more than strictly the
hardship arising from the distinct value of the lawyer or firm as
counsel in the particular case."' 55
"If the substantial hardship exception were liberally applied by
152. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 607.
153. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 339, at 3
(1975):
[Wihere a complex suit has been in preparation over a long period of time and a
development which could not be anticipated makes the lawyer's testimony essen-
tial . . . .Similarly, a long or extensive professional relationship with a client
may have afforded a lawyer, or a firm, such an extraordinary familiarity with
the client's affairs that the value to the client of representation by that lawyer or
firm in a trial involving those matters would clearly outweigh the disadvantages
of having the lawyer, or a lawyer in the firm, testify to some disputed and signifi-
cant issue . . . .a lawyer having knowledge of misconduct of a juror during the
trial of a case is not required to withdraw as counsel in the proceedings ....
See also Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. at 361 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (substantial hardship
argument is weaker when the attorney and client knew in advance of the issue); MacArthur v.
Bank of N.Y., 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1210-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (An attorney with a high degree
of technical expertise developed for a technical case or a long standing relationship providing
extraordinary and irreplaceable familiarity with the client's affairs could rise to the level of
distinctive value.); Wydick, supra note 22, at 671 (An example of distinctive value includes
the case in which an attorney has "developed an encyclopedic knowledge of the facts and legal
theories relevant to the case" over an extended period of time, and only learns "shortly before
trial" that he must be a witness.).
154. See supra note 47.
155. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:503 (Apr. 14, 1984).
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the courts, it would remove much of the sting from the trial counsel/
witness rule. ' 158 This liberal interpretation of "substantial hardship"
and "distinctive value" is important because an opponent is most
likely to seek disqualification when it would most hurt the advocate-
witness's case.' 57 A broader substantial hardship exception "could
work to alleviate the use of [disqualification] as a tactical
weapon."'5 8 The Court of Military Appeals, in Baca, applying the
exception absent "demonstrated good cause" why it should not do
so,1 59 implemented a liberal interpretation of the substantial hard-
ship exception.
Applying a broader substantial hardship exception places the
burden on the moving party to show that replacement counsel is
available, in order to show that the harm the moving party suffers
due to the testimony outweighs the cost and inconvenience to the
client of losing his chosen counsel. Such a burden on the moving
party would improve the client's chances of proceeding with that
counsel. The extent of the broader exception's true benefit would de-
pend on how difficult the courts made the burden of showing good
cause for disqualification.
Unfortunately, the current rigid majority view of the substantial
hardship exception, and the meaning of "distinctive value" within
that exception, "plays right into the hands of a litigant who wants to
delay and harass. Through a motion to disqualify, such a litigant can
put off an impending trial and often saddle the opponent with enor-
mous added expense."' 60 Correcting such improper tactical uses of
the advocate-witness rule was a concern of the drafters of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct."
D. Model Rules of Professional Conduct
1. The Relevant Model Rules Provisions.-In August 1983
the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 62 One of the rules that under-
went some change was the advocate-witness rule. In the Model
156. Wydick, supra note 22, at 672.
157. MacArthur v. Bank of N.Y., 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[A]n
attempt to have an opposing counsel disqualified is most likely to occur when that counsel is
for some reason irreplaceable.").
158. Id.
159. United States v. Baca, 27 MJ. 110, 119 (C.M.A. 1988).
160. Wydick, supra note 22, at 673. Tactical applications of the advocate-witness rule
are considered in greater depth infra notes 400-29 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 168-85 and accompanying text.
162. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Preface at x (1984).
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Rules, the codification of the advocate-witness rule is encompassed
in four rules: Rule 3.7; Rule 1.7; Rule 1.9; and Rule 1.10. Rule 3.7
codifies the actual advocate-witness rule, incorporating the others by
reference.
Rule 3.7 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another
lawyer in the firm is likely to be called as a witness unless pre-
cluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.161
The Model Code comparison expressly addresses only one issue,
the merger of the old Model Code's "formality" and "uncontested"
exceptions into the Rule 3.7(a)(1) "uncontested" exception. 1" This
absence of express drafter comment has left the interpretation of this
new codification of the advocate-witness rule to courts and
163. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1984). Rule 1.7 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not ad-
versely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to
a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation . ...
Rule 1.9 provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the inter-
ests of the former client unless the former consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage
of the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit with
respect to a client or when the information has become generally known.
Finally, Rule 1.10 provides:
(a) When lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so by Rule 1.7. 1.9 . . ..
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected
client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
164. Id. Rule 3.7 comment.
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commentators.
The drafters of Rule 3.7 relied on only three of the rationales
for the advocate-witness rule. 6 First, advocate-witness testimony
unfairly harms the opposing party; second, it can create a conflict
between the lawyer and his client. 66 The third rationale seems to be
a concern for the judicial system, centering on a possible confusion
of the roles of advocate and witness. 67
The Model Rules codification of the advocate-witness rule seeks
to "minimize the use of the trial counsel/witness rule as a tactical
weapon by an adversary who wants to harass or delay."'' 8 Rule 3.7
relies on Rule 1.7 to handle the situation in which an attorney's pos-
sible testimony will somehow conflict with an interest of his client." 9
"Where the conflict is such as to clearly call in question the fair or
efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly
raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution,
however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. 170
This language amounts to a warning to courts "to be wary of the
motives of an adversary who seeks to become a client's protec-
tor-just as one might suspect a wolf who seeks to guard the chicken
coop."1
71
Another significant aspect of Rule 1.7 is that it provides for cli-
ent consent to the conflict, after consultation . 72 Even when a possi-
ble conflict exists, Rule 3.7, by incorporating Rule 1.7, has appar-
ently provided a client consent mechanism to defuse an opponent's
objection based on that opponent's alleged desire to protect the advo-
cate-witness's client from such conflict.
173
165. For the rationale of the Rule as it existed prior to the promulgation of the Model
Rules, see infra notes 203-359 and accompanying text.
166. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 comment (1984). See also
Law. Man. of Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:502 (Apr. 14, 1984) ("Combining the roles of
advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest
between the lawyer and the client.").
167. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 comment (1984).
168. Wydick, supra note 22, at 677.
169. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 comment (1984). See
Wydick, supra note 22, at 700 ("[N]o skilled advocate can accurately predict the extent to
which the trier-of-fact may be influenced by a piece of damaging evidence extracted from the
client's own trial counsel."); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 339, at 4 (1975).
170. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1984).
171. Wydick, supra note 22, at 678.
172. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a)(2), (b)(2) (1984).
173. Client consent only applies to the conflict of interest provisions. Rule 3.7 itself con-
tains no consent provision. See Wydick, supra note 22, at 677 n.129 (Professor Wydick states
that this lack of a consent provision in Rule 3.7 is "because [the authors of the rule] want to
protect not just the client (Model Rule 1.7), but also the adversary and the integrity of the
legal profession (Model Rule 3.7)). See also Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
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Furthermore, the "substantial hardship" exception in the Model
Rules still contains the term "substantial hardship," but no longer do
the words "distinctive value" appear in the rule or the comment."
Instead, the rule demands a balancing of the litigants' interests.
175
The comment to Rule 3.7 identifies the balancing factors as "the
nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's
testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will con-
flict with that of other witnesses." 7' It further provides that "[e]ven
if there is a risk of such prejudice . . . due regard must be given to
the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client.' 77 The final fac-
tor is the foreseeability to either or both sides of an advocate-witness
problem. 1 8
The structure of these "substantial hardship" balancing factors
requires the party moving for disqualification to show that the law-
yer is a necessary witness, that the lawyer's testimony will prejudice
it, and that the harm it will incur outweighs the harm to the client of
losing his lawyer. Additionally, before the Rule 3.7 balancing test
applies, the attorney who wishes to testify must ensure that his rep-
resentation is consistent with the conflict provisions of Rules 1.7, 1.9,
and 1.10.179
If the moving party loses on his motion at any step along this
path to disqualification, he can still attempt to suppress the testi-
mony on evidentiary bases such as hearsay or Federal Rule of Evi-
61:508 (Apr. 14, 1984) ("but Model Rule 3.7's more liberal "substantial hardship" exception
obviates the need for waiver").
174. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:501 (Apr. 14, 1984). See also
Wydick, supra note 22, at 678.
175. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 comment (1984).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. See also Wydick, supra note 22, at 693 (To this list of factors offered in the
comment to Rule 3.7 Professor Wydick would add "Who is the trier-of-fact?" on the theory
that a judge is far less likely to be confused than a jury.). This suggestion is a good one. See
infra notes 451-57 and accompanying text. Professor Wydick also suggests that, in close cases,
the attorney should be allowed to remain on the case because certain harm will result if he is
disqualified, and only possible harm will result if he remains the trial counsel. For example, the
attorney may not testify, or the case may never get to trial. Id. at 694. This suggestion, too, is
a good one.
179. The standard a lawyer should use in assessing potential conflicts appears in the
comment to Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7. Interestingly, the following lan-
guage was included in the proposed final draft to Rule 1.7, quoted in Wydick, supra note 22,
at 681 n.150: "[W]hen a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree
to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for
such agreement, or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent." The absence of
such language in the August 1984 Rule 1.7 comment may signal an intent to make it easier
for the lawyer to escape conflict and rely on client consent, since most neutral lawyers would
opt for the safe approach when it was not their case or their client's money.
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dence 403.10 Under Rule 403, the moving counsel would argue that
the prejudicial impact of the advocate's testimony substantially and
unfairly outweighs any probative value such testimony might have in
the case. To support his motion, the moving counsel would rely upon
the same reasons that failed to persuade the court in his motion to
disqualify. The traditional bases for the advocate-witness rule not re-
ferred to by the drafters of Rule 3.7 could also sway the court to
suppress the testimony, particularly a court that is not fond of attor-
neys testifying. 81
Also ameliorating the impact of the advocate-witness rule upon
the client is Rule 1.10, the firm conflict provision.182 Under this rule,
another lawyer from the original advocate's firm may conduct the
trial even if the advocate-witness rule disqualifies the original coun-
sel, 83 unless there is a conflict of interest."6 4 As a result, the process
of changing attorneys should be less costly to the client.
The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility represent a con-
siderable step back from what turned out to be the high water mark
of the advocate-witness rule and the low ebb of attorney-client free-
dom. This step back is a step in the right direction for the legal
profession. As one commentator aptly noted, "the Model Rules offer
us a scalpel where the Code offers us a garden spade.' 
8 5
2. Meaning of "Likely to Be a Necessary .Witness."-The
opinion of courts and commentators is that the Rule 3.7 language
setting a threshold of "likely to be a necessary witness" before courts
engage in the balancing test places a higher burden on the opposing
party seeking disqualification than did the Model Code standard.186
The interpretation of "necessary" is not unanimous. The American
Bar Association has stated that the term means "no other witness
could testify, and obviates disqualification if the lawyer's testimony
is merely cumulative." ' 7 Professor Wydick, in a hypothetical
180. Wydick, supra note 22, at 685.
181. See infra notes 203-359 and accompanying text for the discussion of the traditional
bases for the advocate-witness rule.
182. See supra note 163.
183. See Baker v. Leahy, 633 F. Supp. 763, 765, n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In Re American
Cable Publications, Inc., 768 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1985).
184. American Cable, 768 F.2d at 1196. See Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
61:501 (Apr. 14, 1984).
185. Wydick, supra note 22, at 701.
186. See, e.g., Canon Airways v. Franklin Holdings Corp., 669 F. Supp. 96, 100 (D.
Del. 1987); Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:507 (Apr. 14, 1984).
187. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:507 (Apr. 14, 1984).
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designed to illustrate the meaning of "necessary,' assumed that
other witnesses saw what the lawyer saw, and that all witnesses
"have equal powers of perception, memory, and narration, and [fur-
ther have] equal qualities of credibility." '189 If Professor Wydick is
correct in requiring such an assumption, the "necessary" require-
ment may offer little protection to the advocate. All witnesses are
unique. They will not all be equally perceptive or credible. A lawyer
will likely be one of the best witnesses, for he is generally well-edu-
cated, trained to discern important facts, and arguably articulate.
The notes to the 1981 proposed final draft of the Model Rules
included additional insight into changes to the old Model Code ap-
proach in reducing the tactical use of the advocate-witness rule
through the use of this idea of the "necessary" witness. The Rule
3.7(a) language "likely to be a necessary witness" means that no
other witness could testify.' "The authors of the Model Rules thus
seek to bury the notion that the trial counsel/witness rule should
apply whenever a trial counsel might conceivably be a witness."' 9'
One final note on the meaning of "necessary" is that the word
does not appear in Rule 3.7(b), but only in Rule 3.7(a). Reconciling
the wording of these two paragraphs in light of the fact that they are
in the same rule is a common method of construing a rule. Disquali-
fying a firm because one of its members is "likely to be called as a
witness" would be different, and presumably easier, than disqualify-
ing the trial advocate himself, who must be "likely to be a necessary
witness."'9 2 Such a construction is illogical. It should be easier to
disqualify the trial counsel when he must testify than when a mem-
ber of his firm will take the stand.
3. Applying Old Thinking to the New Rule.-Many courts
and some commentators burden Rule 3.7 with some of the rigid
thinking of the Model Code's codification of the rule. This approach
strips the Model Rules codification of many, even all, of the changes
implemented in the Model Rules.
Courts often anchor the Model Rules codification with the old
188. Wydick supra note 22, at 684-85. The hypothetical makes the point that the less
necessary the attorney is as a witness, the more open he is to having his testimony suppressed
through a Federal Rule of Evidence 403 motion. The probative value is small, or he would be
necessary, but the prejudicial value allegedly associated with an advocate also testifying still
remains.
189. Id. at 684.
190. Id. at 678.
191. Id. at 678 n.138.
192. Dalrymple v. National Bank & Trust Co. of Traverse City, 615 F. Supp. 979, 989
(C.D, Mich. 1985).
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Model Code version by relying on the fact that, "on the printed
page, Rule 3.7 strongly resembles its predecessors in the Code." '93
The Court of Military Appeals, recently a leader in clients' rights
under the advocate-witness rule, may be guilty of such a reading of
Model Rule 3.7 and DR's 5-101 and 5-102. In a 1988 case the court
acknowledged that the American Bar Association had adopted the
Model Rules in August 1983, but applied the Model Code as the
rule in the case, calling the Model Code "authoritative guidance on
ethical matters.
194
The court also stated, "The ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and their Comment . . are fully consistent with this dis-
cussion and analysis of the earlier model code."' 19 The results the
court reached may have been "fully consistent,"'96 but the two rules
and their respective approaches to the advocate-witness situation are
very different. Similarly, another federal court found "the standard
of the [Model] Code sufficiently analogous to the standard described
in Rule 3.7"197 to apply DR 5-102 to cases when interpreting Rule
3.7.
Some federal courts are unable to relinquish the paternalistic
role toward the client that was developed under the Model Code.'98
As a result, courts fail to fully implement the Model Rule 3.7
changes in the advocate-witness rule:
Whether or not Rule 3.7's change was intended to afford defer-
ence to the client's judgment, this court finds that the client's
judgment is not properly the controlling factor. Although the cli-
ent's wishes may be considered, the client will almost always be
reluctant to forego the assistance of familiar counsel or to incur
the expense and inconvenience of retaining another lawyer. 99
Finally, courts have retreated to the Model Code version of the
rule by asserting that some of the rationales allegedly supporting the
Model Code also support the Model Rule despite the clear absence
of such factors in Model Rule 3.7 or its comment. Courts speak in
193. Wydick, supra note 22, at 702.
194. United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110, 116 n.5 (C.M.A. 1988).
195. Id. at 118.
196. The Court of Military Appeals' aggressive interpretation of the advocate-witness
rule and reading of the Model Code provisions concerning the advocate-witness rule generated
the same result, not a similarity between the two codifications.
197. Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350, 356 (N.D. I11. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988).
198. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
199. Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. at 361.
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terms of preventing advocates from arguing their own credibility,200
enhancing public perception of the legal profession,21 and protecting
opposing counsel from the difficulty of impeaching a fellow attor-
ney, 20 2 even though none of these factors appear in Rule 3.7 or its
comment.
For nearly 150 years the advocate-witness rule grew increas-
ingly costly for the client. Model Rule 3.7 as drafted attempts to
reverse this trend. Whether courts will apply it as drafted remains to
be seen.
III. Reasons for the Rule
The history of the advocate-witness rule does not inspire great
confidence in the rule. It began with one judge, whose decision was
soon overruled.20 3 It took over half a century before the first codifica-
tion, which was confusing and largely ignored. The Model Code pro-
visions resolved little, if any, of this uncertainty, and also contributed
many interpretation problems. The Model Rules, as drafted, may
correct many of these codification-related issues, but merely because
a rule is or can be codified does not make it necessary.
The advocate-witness rule can work a substantial hardship on
clients. Thus, the reasons postulated by courts and commentators for
the rule must support these consequences. Weak, confusing ratio-
nales indicate that problems with the rule lie not only in its codifica-
tion, but in the rule itself.
The following sections analyze the various rationales supporting
the existence of the advocate-witness rule. After the case for each
rationale is stated, the weaknesses in that purported underpinning
for the rule is discussed.
A. Protecting the Client
1. Advocate-Witness is Easily Impeached.-The American
Bar Association stated that one of the main ethical objections to a
lawyer's testifying for his client is that the advocate is "an obviously
interested witness. ' 20 4 "It takes no vivid imagination to foresee that
200. Duncan v. Poythress, 750 F.2d 1540, 1546 n.18 (11th Cir.), vacated, 756 F.2d
1481 (1985). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, en banc, rendered essentially the
same decision as the vacated opinion in Duncan v. Poythress, 777 F.2d 1508 (11 th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986).
201. Duncan v. Poythress, 750 F.2d 1540, 1546 n.18 (11th Cir.), vacated, 756 F.2d
1481 (1985).
202. In re American Cable Publications, Inc., 768 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1985).
203. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
204. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 339, at 2
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if the suspicion of the jury is aroused about the basic credibility of
the lawyer as a witness, the client's whole cause, regardless of its
merits, might well fall with the discredited lawyer-witness."2 5 This
perceived weakness in attorney testimony typifies the danger to the
client the rule allegedly prevents.20 6
Some courts believe that the roles of advocate and witness are
so inconsistent that they have actually reduced the value of the advo-
cate-witness's testimony even when he is the only witness on an is-
sue. In one case, the court found that the trial court was justified in
ignoring the attorney's uncontradicted testimony. "[I1n the absence
of withdrawal from the case, the interest of the attorney destroyed
the credibility of his testimony."207
An extension of the theory that the attorney-witness is impeach-
able and therefore harmful to his client is that, with his witness cred-
ibility harmed, the lawyer's performance as an advocate may also
suffer. This reduction in the attorney's effectiveness in both roles
must inflict additional harm on his client.20 ' This impeachability the-
ory concludes that withdrawal as trial advocate and severance of the
debilitating ties to the client would renew the value of the advocate-
witness's testimony.20 9
The impeachability rationale for the advocate-witness rule faces
considerable criticism. Withdrawal may not eliminate impeachment
vulnerability. 210 Refusal of employment and withdrawal eliminate
(1975).
205. Fontaine v. Patterson, 305 F.2d 124, 130 (5th Cir. 1962).
206. See Sutton, supra note 22, at 482 (a lawyer witness should not allow himself to
become a less effective witness by being an advocate in the case); Comment, supra note 21, at
133 (case cited in which the attorney's evidence was uncontradicted, yet the court totally ig-
nored it because "the interest of the attorney destroyed the credibility of his testimony.");
Note, supra note 99, at 140 (discussing a decision which held that no credence could be given
such testimony unless there was satisfactory corroboration, and identifying a case that allowed
a jury instruction that the jury may consider that the attorney testified for his client).
207. See Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 257 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1958).
208. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 339
(1975) (The client is entitled to an advocate whose effectiveness cannot be impaired because of
his advocate having been a witness.); Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:504 (Apr.
14, 1984) (diminished credibility as a witness may spill over to affect adversely attorney's
persuasiveness as an advocate for his client); Note, supra note 91, at 797 (diminished witness
credibility may hamper attorney's courtroom advocacy efforts, depriving the client of both a
credible witness and an effective advocate); Note, supra note 16, at 1398 ("The only viable
rationale for prohibiting trial counsel from taking the witness stand is the prospect that his
credibility as both witness and advocate will suffer in the eyes of the jury to the ultimate
detriment of the client." This note advocates an informed client waiver of this danger.).
209. The prevalent objection to the harm to the client rationale is that the client should
be able to waive such harm, but the Model Code does not allow for such consent. See Sutton,
supra note 22, at 484 (Rejection of employment entirely "will leave the attorney as a disinter-
ested witness for the litigant.").
210. This issue of what constitutes withdrawal is addressed supra notes 103-19 and ac-
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impeachability only if the attorney had no ties to the client other
than declining the offer of employment. The attorney may represent
the litigant in other matters. 1' If the attorney withdraws, he may
still have a contingent fee pending. He might also expect future busi-
ness if his testimony benefits the litigant."' In actuality, the interests
of the testifying attorney are substantially the same as any other
witness with a financial bias. There is no rational basis for treating
the advocate-witness differently from other witnesses based on his
impeachability2t 3 "[Withdrawal] is more likely to injure the client's
representation than strengthen his witness. 21
Another criticism of this rationale is that the harm to the client
of his attorney testifying is uncertain. There are other benefits a tes-
tifying advocate may offer his client, such as an unfair advantage in
argument.2 15 This nebulous mix of benefits and detriments associated
with advocate testimony creates an uneasy balance of improper ben-
efit and harm to the client.2 16 This defense against the impeachment
rationale is without merit. The judicial system is sophisticated
enough that it need not rely on one uncertain wrong neutralizing
another to handle the attorney-witness situation.
Not all courts agree that the attorney who is the sole witness is
incredible per se. When the Court of Military Appeals addressed
this situation in United States v. Baca, it stated, "[Alny possibility
[the attorney was] . . . impeachable for interest and . . . a less ef-
fective witness is of no moment: He was the only witness. 21 7 The
Court of Military Appeals probably did not mean that the attorney
was unimpeachable. The attorney had evidence the court needed,
and could testify willingly, violating no rule of evidence. Pursuing a
per se rule of no credibility would deprive the court of whatever evi-
dentiary value remained of the advocate's testimony after opposing
companying text. Withdrawal has been interpreted many ways, for example: from the case
completely, from the trial, and from the role of addressing the trier of fact.
211. Note, supra note 16, at 1395. See also Wydick, supra note 22, at 660. (The attor-
ney may be an ineffective witness because obviously partisan; but withdrawal may not make
him disinterested.).
212. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 611.
213. Note, supra note 16, at 1395. See also Sutton, supra note 22, at 480 (The possibil-
ity of perjury or tailor-made evidence is a restatement of the "long discarded reason once used
to justify disqualification of an interested party.").
214. Enker, supra note 21, at 457. See also Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 610-11
("[I]mpeachability for interest is not likely to evaporate with . .. withdrawal from the
case.").
215. See infra notes 254-66 and accompanying text.
216. See Note, supra note 16, at 1394.
217. United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110, 118 (C.M.A. 1988).
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counsel cross-examined him."' The court's approach in Baca is more
consistent with examining all the evidence and thus is the better rule
for handling the advocate's impeachability.
2. Advocate-Witness and Necessary Objectivity.-The advo-
cate-witness rule prevents another alleged danger to the client. An
advocate who testifies may not perform his representation duties as
effectively because he is emotionally involved as a partisan wit-
ness.219 The advocate-witness rule eliminates this personal involve-
ment and increases attorney objectivity and effectiveness. The trial
judge in Baca relied in part on this basis to relieve the defense coun-
sel of his representation duties after he had testified for his client.
The judge said that the defense counsel "in this case is too emotion-
ally involved to be an effective advocate, and accordingly the public
policy in support of the [advocate-witness] rule is met in fact in this
case."
220
The argument continues that counsel who are involved as wit-
nesses lose so much of their objectivity that they also sacrifice judg-
ment to their client's detriment. 22' Those applying this rationale con-
sider whether a "neutral advocate" would rather have the attorney
as witness or as advocate.22 Relying on an objective "neutral advo-
218. The Baca advocate testimony was before the judge on a pretrial competency issue.
No language in the case indicates a need for a different result if the testimony occurred before
a jury. Though such a case would be harder, the result should be the same. Mere interest in
the case should not bar the sole bearer of relevant evidence from his witness duty to impart his
knowledge of that evidence to the trier of fact, even if that interest originates in his role as
client's counsel.
219. Baca, 27 M.J. at 114. See also Comment, supra note 21, at 144 ("Under the influ-
ence of professional zeal, attorneys become, in feeling, ... completely identified with those
who employ them.").
220. Baca, 27 M.J. at 114.
221. United States v. Siegner, 498 F. Supp. 282, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[llndependent
professional judgment may be clouded . . . .Disqualification will therefore better serve [the
client's] interests and the interests of justice by removing any conflict." The court in this case
was uneasy because the government counsel was asserting that the defense lawyer would ulti-
mately testify against his client). See also Note, supra note 16, at 1396 ("When a lawyer is so
personally involved in the events which form the action, that he has vital testimony to offer
.... [S]uch lawyer's judgment is likely to be affected.").
222. Siegner, 498 F. Supp. at 286 (It is "entirely possible that a different defense coun-
sel might wish to call (the advocate] to testify" on the client's behalf); see Supreme Beef
Processors v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (N.D. Tex. 1977)
(court acts as the neutral advocate to tell the attorney he should testify to corroborate the
client's story, because the client is entitled to "every scrap of favorable evidence that is availa-
ble not only the favorable evidence that is essential to his case"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 339, at 2 (1975) (states the obvious: "[Gliven a choice
between two or more witnesses competent to testify as to contested issues, and other factors
being equal, a client's cause is best served by having the testimony from the witness not sub-
ject to impeachment in the outcome of the trial"); Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
61:509 (Apr. 14, 1984) (explains why the courts must take this paternalistic approach: "A
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cate" test is shallow. Almost every neutral advocate, given a choice,
will choose a professional as a witness.
The Court of Military Appeals did not endorse this excessive
emotional involvement rationale. 223 Excessive involvement with a cli-
ent may cause ineffectiveness in some circumstances, but it should
not result in disqualification under the advocate-witness rule.224
Again, the Court of Military Appeals' approach is a good one. At-
torneys often accept cases because they believe in the cause. Exces-
sive emotional involvement potentially impairing representation
should not be a reason to disqualify counsel. Rather, it should be
part of an ineffective assistance claim by the client, should the in-
volvement impair the attorney-witness's performance as advocate.
3. Costs of the Rule.-The advocate-witness rule purports to
serve the client, but there seems to be little concern with the cost to
the client of applying the rule. The only party who stands to lose
when courts enforce the rule is the client.2 5 Refusing testimony
without the advocate first withdrawing, refusing advocate participa-
tion as trial counsel after testifying, and chastising the advocate-wit-
ness in the presence of the jury are all sanctions that punish the
client. Thus, the "client is twice injured, once by the attorney and
once by the court." '226 Dean Wigmore stated, "Why-punish the inno-
cent client? Why not suspend the counsel from practice? Courts are
sometimes queerly illogical. ''22 7 To prevent an attorney from being
both advocate and witness because he may be biased or perceived to
be biased by the trier of fact is costly to the client and harmful to his
cause. 2
28
Any application of the advocate-witness rule harms the client by
denying the client his first choice of counsel. The harm is exacer-
bated when a court enforces the rule in a rigid fashion, instead of
applying a balancing approach to the facts of the case before it.229
party can be represented by other attorneys, but cannot obtain substitute testimony for a coun-
sel's relevant personal knowledge").
223. United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110, 115 (C.M.A. 1988).
224. Id.
225. Note, supra note 16, at 1400.
226. Sutton, supra note 22, at 496.
227. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 17, at 788 (Dean Wigmore made this statement when
discussing appellate courts ordering a new trial when a counsel breached professional ethics by
being an advocate and witness in the same case); see Note, supra note 31, at 299.
228. Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350, 357 (N.D. III. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988).
229. The drafters of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct rejected this harsh ap-
proach, recognizing "that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those
of the opposing party." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 comment (1984).
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The American Bar Association endorsed such a rigid approach in
Formal Opinion 339, issued in 1975: "Any doubt about the answer
to the ethical question . ..should be resolved in favor of the law-
yer's testifying and against his becoming or continuing as
counsel."2 '
One rationale for this rigid approach is to protect the client.
Allegedly, paternalism is justified because the client will be reluctant
to forego familiar counsel and to incur the additional expense and
inconvenience of finding a new lawyer. Since the attorney who wants
to stay on the case will be advising the client on the issue, client
consent may be tainted by bad advice.23' Once again, an ineffective
assistance of counsel action is a better means of handling the attor-
ney who gives erroneous advice.232 Justice is better served by deter-
mining in each case whether a mechanical, rigid application of the
rule might not cause more harm than good to the client and the
judicial system. 38
Yet another cost of the advocate-witness rule to the client is
that it effectively penalizes the forethought to hire an attorney in
advance of litigation.23 4 "To some people unaccustomed to dealing
with lawyers, hiring a lawyer is traumatic; and being forced to re-
peat the process may mean more than recurring trauma, it may
cause the client to forsake his claim.
23 5
230. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 339, at 4-5
(1975).
231. MacArthur v. Bank of N.Y., 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),(The court
recognized that the opposing party's late disqualification motion had tactical overtones, but
concluded that "such abuse by opposing counsel does not cure the original violation and cannot
vitiate the disciplinary rule."). See also United States v. Maloney, 241 F. Supp. 49, 51 (W.D.
Pa. 1965) (The United States government will not automatically receive a continuance to pro-
cure replacement counsel if the United States attorney must withdraw and testify, because the
defendant's pretrial motion to disqualify him has given him ample advanced warning of the
issue.).
232. The court in United States v. Siegner, 498 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
would disagree as to whether this is better for the client because a failure to withdraw being
challenged as ineffective
would remain forever open ...[causing] a climate of uncertainty unfair to the
government, and most importantly, to the defendant . . . . [The] confidence of
the people in the criminal justice system is not enhanced by such doubts ...
[and] raises the specter of deliberate abuse by defendants and their attorneys,
who may seek to avoid disqualification in . . .the hope of later seeking reversal
of a conviction or withdrawal of a guilty plea.
233. International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1294 (2d Cir. 1975).
234. Note, supra note 16, at 1367. See also Note, supra note 91, at 807 (The "rule
effectively penalizes individuals for having the foresight to consult an attorney on a legal prob-
lem in advance.").
235. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 614 n.82. See Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage
Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348, 1352 (D. Colo. 1976):
One reason for maintaining a continuing relationship with a lawyer or law firm
is to prevent the difficulty which would ensue if each time litigation was com-
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A tangible cost of the advocate-witness rule to the client is liter-
ally a cost in terms of dollars. Employing the advocate-witness rule
may force the client to incur considerable expense to employ another
counsel. This second lawyer is usually less suitable to the client, or
else the client would have retained him initially."3 6 Additionally, the
disqualified attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee for services al-
ready performed. 3 7 As a result, in contingent fee situations, "it may
be difficult, or at least costly, to find subsequent counsel. 2 38
Class actions are another area in which the advocate-witness
rule is expensive. Federal law allows parties, including lawyers, to
plead their own cases. 239 One federal district court allowed an advo-
cate-witness-party to represent herself only after forcing her to with-
draw from representing the other members of the class.240
This handling of class action representation is inefficient. The
result of applying the rule is that the class must hire different law-
yers. The attorney-witness-litigant must go through a charade of
withdrawing and converting to pro se representation, while still re-
maining active at the trial. Costs to the plaintiff class increase with
the addition of another advocate, and the costs of a losing defendant
possibly increase if he must pay the winning class's attorney fees.
The court and parties may also suffer delays while the additional
attorneys prepare their cases.
Ironically, the bases for the advocate-witness rule apply "more
strongly to the lawyer representing himself, since he is more im-
peachable for interest, and therefore potentially more embarrassing
to the profession."' " Yet, the lawyer-litigant is beyond the reach of
that rule. "[I]t is implicit that a lay party may not only try his own
menced a new attorney would be required to familiarize himself with the client
and its business . . . .A client who desires to head off a court battle should not
be penalized for having the foresight to employ legal counsel before the com-
mencement of a lawsuit.
Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 621 (The only way employing the advocate-witness rule
may resolve litigation is by closing the court house door to the client. If he continues to pursue
his claim, both he and the judicial system incur costs and delays associated with finding a new
lawyer.).
236. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 607. See Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int'l v. Style
Cos., 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985) (costs of disqualification could be high).
237. Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350, 361 n.6 (N.D. II. 1984), revd on
other grounds, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988).
238. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 614.
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982).
240. Duncan v. Poythress, 750 F.2d 1540, 1541 (llth Cir.), vacated, 756 F.2d 1481
(1985). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, en banc, rendered essentially the same
decision as the vacated opinion in Duncan v. Poythress, 777 F.2d 1508 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986).
241. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 615.
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case but also testify on his own behalf. We do not think because he
is a lawyer he should be deprived of that right."242 If the rights of
the lawyer to represent and testify for himself can overcome the situ-
ation in which the advocate-witness rule would seem most applica-
ble, then the judicial system would seem able to survive without it.
4. Testifying Against the Client.-The last contention sup-
porting the advocate-witness rule under the rationale that it protects
the client arises when the attorney will be called by the opposing
party to testify against his client's interests. Presumably, such testi-
mony would not concern a privileged matter, or the attorney could
block such a move by the opposing counsel.2"3 Generally,
no disciplinary rule requires the withdrawal of a lawyer who, at
trial, is called as a witness by an opposing party if the lawyer
had no previous knowledge or reasonable basis for believing that
he ought to be called by that party . . . .[If the] testimony will
be adverse to the client . . . we are not prepared to hold that it
would never be ethically permissible, but we note that with such
employment the lawyer also accepts a heavy responsibility.
2 44
The principal basis for this rationale is that the damage adverse
advocate-witness testimony may do to the client's case is incalcula-
ble, and that no client should bear this enormous risk. "[N]o skilled
advocate can accurately predict the extent to which the trier of fact
may be influenced by a piece of damaging evidence extracted from
the client's own trial counsel. 21 45 This situation presents the greatest
threat to the client of all the situations in which the advocate-witness
rule exists to protect him.
One interesting approach to solving this problem without the
advocate-witness rule would be for the prospective advocate-witness
to rely on Federal Rule of Evidence 40316 to argue that his testi-
mony's probative value is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial
effect to his client. Such an argument would be enhanced by other
evidence tending to make the attorney's testimony cumulative. 4 '7
Should this evidentiary argument fail, informed client consent
should prevail. The client should be allowed to assume the risk asso-
242. International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975).
243. See, e.g., MIL. R. EvID. 502.
244. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 339, at 4
(1975).
245. Wydick, supra note 22, at 700.
246. See supra note 119 for the text of this evidentiary rule.
247. Wydick, supra note 22, at 688 n.189.
ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE
ciated with his counsel's adverse testimony. An ineffective assistance
of counsel remedy exists if the attorney's decision to remain on the
case, or his advice leading to the client's consent to his dual role, is
incompetent.
When the basis for the advocate-witness rule is client protec-
tion, the advocate-witness rule unnecessarily separates trial advo-
cates from other witnesses. "[L]awyers as a class are not so immoral
as to lie under oath, and their testimony on behalf of their clients
should not be discredited automatically. Instead, the testimony of
the advocate should be accorded the same treatment as that of any
other interested witness."24 Courts should not rigidly apply the ad-
vocate-witness rule to sever the attorney-client relationship, either as
trial counsel or in any other representational capacity, without con-
sidering the harm to the client in light of the supposed benefit. In-
formed client consent is an appropriate substitute when the reason
for applying the advocate witness rule is to protect the client.
B. Protecting the Opposing Party
A second benefit flowing from the advocate-witness rule is the
protection of the party opposing the advocate-witness. Such protec-
tion is designed to preserve equal footing for both sides in the
litigation.
1. Cross-examining Opposing Counsel.-One reason often
cited for the advocate-witness rule is to relieve opposing counsel of
the awkwardness associated with cross-examining a fellow attor-
ney.24 9 Allowing an attorney to testify could allow him to abuse pro-
fessional courtesy to blunt the opposition's cross-examination.
In one case, the fear was not a timid cross-examination, but one
that was too fierce. 50 Preventing advocate testimony in this case pre-
248. Comment, supra note 101, at 270.
249. International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1294 (2d Cir. 1975). See also
In re American Cable Publications, Inc., 768 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1985) ("uneasy situ-
ation arises when opposing counsel must impeach on cross-examination another lawyer-adver-
sary"); Cramer, supra note 127, at 824 ("opposing counsel may encounter difficulty challeng-
ing the credibility of a witness who also appears as an advocate in the case"); Enker, supra
note 21, at 457 ("some lingering fear that opposing counsel's sense of professional fraternity
will overcome his partisan duty to his client"); Comment, supra note 101, at 271 (the opposing
counsel will be "in the embarrassing predicament of attacking the credibility of a professional
colleague"); Note, supra note 16, at 1370-71 ("fear that professional courtesy will inhibit
opposing counsel from effectively cross-examining his opponent").
250. Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350, 362 (N.D. I11. 1984) ("Embitterment
between counsel, also detrimental to the process, is likely to occur when one counsel seeks to
impeach the credibility of opposing counsel . . . . [Olne cannot imagine two more bitterly
opposing foes [than those before the court]"), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir.
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vents opposing counsel from losing his objectivity and thus from be-
ing less than effective in representing his client.
This rationale for the rule receives a chilly reception from those
commentators who have considered it. One basis for rejecting this
rationale is the ethical duty of the opposing counsel to cross-examine
any witness as best suits the interests of his client. 51 Such a duty
will overcome any conflict with a desire to be excessively courteous
to the opposing advocate-witness. Furthermore, once disqualified as
trial counsel the witness remains a fellow attorney. 52 Thus, the ad-
vocate-witness rule cannot eliminate misguided courtesy to fellow
lawyers.
Similarly, the excessive ferocity concern has no merit. As long
as the cross-examination comports with the rules of evidence, the
heavy-handed prophylactic measure of disqualifying the testifying
counsel as trial counsel for his client is unjustified. The trial judge
can use his supervisory authority to keep cross-examination within
appropriate bounds. 5 a
2. Testifying Enhancing Argument.-Fear that the advocate
testifying will unfairly enhance the credibility of his argument is an-
other commonly advanced basis for protecting the opposing party
with the advocate-witness rule. 54 Arguably, the advocate-witness
1988).
251. See, e.g., Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int'l v. Style Cos., 760 F.2d 1045, 1049-50 (9th
Cir. 1985). In this case, the opposing party actually claimed such prejudice. The court said the
advocate did not want to testify in the first place; his prospective testimony was only an issue
because of a motion to disqualify made by opposing counsel. Furthermore, the court stated
that opposing counsel has an ethical duty stronger than professional loyalty to a fellow attor-
ney. Id. See also Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F.
Supp. 1348, 1354 (D. Colo. 1976) (lawyer's duty to represent a client competently and zeal-
ously would easily overcome any inhibiting effects of professional loyalty); Law. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:505 (Apr. 14, 1984); Enker, supra note 21, at 458 ("an ethical
dilemma for opposing counsel rather than for the attorney who testifies").
252. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 612. See also Optyl Eyewear, 760 F.2d at 1050
(impeaching opposing counsel awkward whether he is disqualified or not); Wydick, supra note
22, at 662 (the advocate-witness rule does not solve the problem because the testifying attor-
ney remains a colleague at the bar); Comment, supra note 101, at 271 ("an attorney who
withdraws from participation as trial counsel retains his professional status"); Note, supra
note 16, at 1388.
253. See, e.g., MIL. R. EvID. 611.
254. In re American Cable Publications, Inc., 768 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1985)
("[tlhe [advocate-witness] rules prevent situations in which others might think the lawyer, as
witness, is . . . enhancing his own credibility as an advocate by virtue of having taken an oath
as a witness"); Comment, supra note 21, at 144 (danger that the jury will give undue testimo-
nial weight to the attorney's argument); Note, supra note 91, at 798 (jury or judge might
place too much weight on the testifying lawyer's closing arguments); Note, supra note 16, at
1370 (converse of the impeachment by interest rationale; the opposing party will suffer be-
cause of testimonial weight placed on the lawyer's closing arguments).
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rule prevents a perception that the testifying lawyer "is enhancing
his own credibility as advocate by virtue of having taken an oath as
a witness. 255
Another basis for the rule flows from this enhanced argument
theory. The advocate-witness rule protects the opposing party from
improper argument by the attorney-witness. The advocate-witness
may become confused during argument and interject personal opin-
ion suited only to the witness stand into his argument.250
Closely related to the enhanced argument theory is an enhanced
testimony theory. An attorney is an officer of the court. A jury may
"place undue weight" on his testimony.2 5 Also, the advocate-witness
could gain an undue advantage by "vouching for his own credibility
in summing up to the jury.9
2 8
Yet another rationale for the rule linked to the enhanced credi-
bility concern is the "famous lawyer" application of the advocate-
witness rule. Since the lawyer's reputation affects the weight given
his testimony, the rule could protect the opposing party from the
famous litigator taking advantage of his name, particularly if oppos-
ing counsel is less well known.259
The notion that the advocate-witness rule is intended to prevent
the possibly enhanced credibility of an attorney witness has been
criticized. Dean Wigmore stated that this reason is rarely advanced
and derives its "only importance" because it was raised in Stones v.
Byron, the case which created the advocate-witness rule in 1846.26o
If a jury chooses to give unusual weight to a counsel's argument, it is
probably due to the counsel's method of presentation or his reputa-
tion, and not because of an oath he took at some earlier point in the
trial.26' In a case with the judge as the trier of fact, this rationale
255. In re American Cable Publications, Inc., 768 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1985).
256. Wydick, supra note 22, at 663 n.58.
257. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:505 (Apr. 14, 1984). See also supra
note 254.
258. Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350, 357 (N.D. I1. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988).
259. Levin & Levy, Persuading the Jury With Facts Not in Evidence: The Fiction-
Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 139, 153 (1956). The authors cite an apparent paradox
of allowing Bible stories, literature, and hypothetical tales in closing argument, but not a true
personal anecdote. They offer as a possible reason that allowing such anecdotes might give
improper advantage to the older and better known lawyer. Id. at 148-58.
260. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 17, at 780.
261. Note, supra note 16, at 1387. "The appearance of a particular lawyer as either a
witness or an advocate does not in itself make his advocacy more appealing. [l]t is difficult to
see how the fact he simultaneously appears as both could increase his influence on the trier-of-
fact." Sutton, supra note 22, at 480.
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evaporates. 6 '
Trial advocates almost always know of facts not introduced into
evidence. There is no reason to believe a lawyer-witness would im-
properly argue such facts more often merely because he witnessed
them.263
Professor Enker found the idea of testimony unfairly enhancing
argument not "terribly convincing" not only because it is at odds
with the impeachability argument,64 but also because a witness's
credibility, lawyer or otherwise, derives primarily from his reputa-
tion.218 The famous attorney argument fails because the "personal
veracity of the advocate is no less involved" whether it enters the
trial implicitly via argument or explicitly from the witness stand.2 6
3. The Testifying Prosecutor.-Criminal defendants receive
the largest benefit of any party to litigation when the advocate-wit-
ness rule prevents prosecutor testimony. "A jury naturally gives to
the evidence of the prosecuting attorney far greater weight than to
that of the ordinary witness . . . . [T]he practice of acting as prose-
cutor and witness is not to be approved, and should not be indulged
in, except under the most extraordinary circumstances. 267 Prosecu-
tor testimony may circumvent the presumption of innocence, and re-
place it with a presumption "that public officials do not prosecute
men whom they believe are innocent. 268 Prosecutors should not tes-
tify, even if the state must accept a delay to bring another attorney
into the case. Courts should look favorably upon a defense motion to
exclude such testimony on the grounds that it is substantially more
prejudicial than probative, particularly when the prosecutor attempts
to remain as the trial counsel.
262. Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp.
1348, 1354 (D. Colo. 1976); see also Note, supra note 16, at 1387. But see Note, supra note
91, at 798 (judge might place too much weight on the testifying lawyer's closing arguments).
263. Sutton, supra note 22, at 480-81.
264. See Wydick, supra note 22, at 663, concerning this conflict with the ineffective
witness rationale.
265. Enker, supra, note 21, at 460-61.
266. Levin & Levy, supra note 259, at 157.
267. Robinson v. United States, 32 F.2d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 1928). In this case the court
found that other prosecutors were available and familiar with the case, and so directed the
withdrawal.
268. Levin & Levy, supra note 259, at 156. These authors also stated that the risk is
greatest when the prosecutor compares the evidence in the case at hand with evidence in other
cases. But see Baker v. Leahy, 633 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1985): "[Witness who is a govern-
ment attorney does not have a financial interest in the outcome of litigation . . This lack of
financial interest justifies a narrow construction of the rule in cases where no prejudice is
shown." Id. at 765. In this case, a member of the government attorney's office sought to tes-
tify, so the court did not address the prosecutor issue per se.
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C. Protecting the Testifying Attorney
The third major rationale supporting the advocate-witness rule
involves a concern for protecting the attorney's dignity and for
preventing him from getting involved in a situation too complex to
handle competently.
1. Arguing His Own Testimony.-The desire to prevent an at-
torney from having to argue his own credibility is one basis for the
advocate-witness rule with ties to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court's opinion in French v. Hall2' 9 identified a problem with
an attorney commenting on his own testimony. "In some cases it
may be unseemly, especially if counsel is in a position to comment on
his own testimony, and the practice [of being advocate and witness
in the same case] may be very properly discouraged . *..."270 This
theme of awkwardness or unseemliness pervades the advocate-wit-
ness literature.271
Whether to testify or not, and thus expose the advocate to a
difficult closing argument, should be a tactical decision similar to the
one the attorney should make in assessing his own impeachability.
272
Arguing the attorney's own credibility to the jury should not be the
basis for the advocate-witness rule. The jury is able to evaluate the
witness's credibility based on his testimony. 73 The degree of harm
due to any unseemliness should be one of the decisions an informed
client can choose to accept.274
2. Difficulty in Separating Witness and Advocate
Roles.-Commentators advance the rationale that a lawyer would
have difficulty separating his dual roles as advocate and witness in
the same case. As one scholar dramatically stated:
To attempt to be both advocate and witness is to attempt to be
269. 119 U.S. 152 (1886).
270. Id. at 154.
271. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 339, at 2
(1975) (unseemly position of arguing his own credibility); Cramer, supra note 127, at 824 (an
advocate who argues his own credibility is at a disadvantage); Sutton, supra, note 22, at 481
(1963) ("Ultimately, the testifying advocate occupies the dubious and embarrassing position of
trying to argue convincingly to the jury the strength and impartiality of his own testimony.");
Comment, supra note 21, at 144 ("unseemly for the attorney to place himself in a position
. . . to address the court or the jury on the question of what degree of credibility should be
given to his own sworn testimony"); Note, supra note 91, at 798 (rule prevents the attorney
from being placed in the difficult position of arguing "the strength and impartiality of his own
testimony").
272. Enker, supra note 21, at 458.
273. Comment, supra note 101, at 271.
274. Wydick, supra note 22, at 661.
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both partisan and nonpartisan at once. Almost inevitably, the
two roles will become mixed; the partisanship of the advocate
will be decreased, and the testimony of the witness will become
less detached . . . . The dual role is too difficult; the lawyer
should not be subjected to such a riptide of demands .
Proponents of this rationale assert that acting in both the capacity of
attorney and witness is too difficult for the lawyer to handle well, or
even competently.
Professor Sutton is not alone in identifying this difficulty in role
separation as one of the bases for the rule.27 One court even pro-
claimed this difficulty to be "a tribute to the high calling of advocacy
[since it was] virtually impossible . . . to drop the garments of advo-
cacy and take on the somber garb of objective fact-stater." 2"
Nor is Professor Sutton alone in his concern for the trial coun-
sel's emotional health. The trial judge in Baca felt the dual role of
testifying as to the client's lack of competency and then arguing the
merits of the case in a later session before the trier of fact would be
"a traumatic experience" and a "philosophical inconsistency. '"278
Concern for the trial advocate is healthy, but it should not over-
ride a client's choice of counsel.2 79 This alleged basis for the rule is
speculative and excessively paternalistic toward trial advocates. The
advocate and his client should assess this risk, if one exists. With
client consent and the ineffective assistance remedy available should
the counsel's advice or decision prove incompetent, the attorney
should proceed as he feels best suits the client's interests.
3. Desire to Please the Client.-Related to the notion that the
dual roles of advocate and witness are too difficult for one lawyer is
the rationale that loyalty to his client may cloud the advocate-wit-
ness's professional judgment. The attorney relies on the client for his
fee and references. Such a fundamental bond can affect the attor-
ney's approach to a case. One court believed that the advocate-wit-
ness role put too much pressure on the attorney. On one hand, the
attorney would realize that withdrawing would benefit his client. On
the other hand, he would want to continue good relations with that
275. Sutton, supra note 22, at 481.
276. Note, supra, note 99, at 141-42 (identifies Wisconsin as relying on this rationale, at
least in part, for the advocate-witness rule).
277. Inglett & Co. v. Everglades Fertilizer Co., 255 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir. 1958).
278. United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110, 113 (C.M.A. 1988).
279. Id. at 118. The Court of Military Appeals rejected summarily the possibility that a
counsel could be disqualified for emotional involvement in the case, stating, "Defense counsel
are not fungible items." Id. at 119.
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client. In this position, the attorney "may-against his better judg-
ment-defer to the client's desire for representation:
28
This rationale for the advocate-witness rule is either an effort to
curb the greedy lawyer or it reflects a low estimation of the attor-
ney's ability to convince his client of what is best in handling his
case. It is the client's case. Hiring a greedy attorney who makes
competent decisions is one of his options. An incompetent, avaricious
attorney is a different matter, but not a justification for an advocate-
witness rule.
4. Embarrassment of Testifying.-Another rationale for the
advocate-witness rule is based on the presumption that testifying can
be as difficult for a lawyer as arguing his own credibility. This basis
for the rule "saves the attorney from any embarrassment resulting
from his own performance on the stand."2 81 In addition to preventing
the trauma of testifying, another reason for this rationale is prevent-
ing the mechanical problem of the advocate questioning himself.282
Both of these possible bases for the rule do not withstand close ex-
amination. There are professional ways for the attorney to question
himself. 28a If the embarrassment is because his testimony does not
ring true under the hammer of a cross-examination, then the discom-
fort is appropriate.
An "attorney's role as a potential witness is often part of his
role as his client's representative." 28 He actually drafts contracts,
monitors meetings, and reviews documents to ensure that they con-
tain the evidence that will free him to be a more objective advo-
cate. 8 5 An attorney should require no protection if his client chooses
both his advocacy and his testimony. The situations concocted to
demonstrate the rule's value in this regard are unreasonable or not
worth remedying by such an enormous sanction as withdrawal or
disqualification of the trial counsel.
280. MacArthur v. Bank of N.Y., 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
281. Note, supra note 16, at 1371.
282. See id. at 1389 n.142 (citing Woody Allen's Bananas (United Artists 1971) as a
"humorous depiction" of this mechanical problem).
283. For example, he could have his questions written and numbered. He then could
read the question number, the question, then turn to the trier of fact, and deliver his response.
He should have no problem with surprise answers, nor should he have to ask himself any
questions resembling a forceful cross-examination. Using an assistant counsel for the direct
and redirect questioning would alleviate all mechanical problems.
284. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 610.
285. Id.
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D. Protecting the Jury
The fourth major justification for the advocate-witness rule is
based upon the fear that jury members may have difficulty sorting
out the confusing advocate-witness situation.
1. Confusion of Advocate and Witness Roles.-The advocate-
witness rule simplifies the jury's task. Jurors are lay people. They do
not have great amounts of courtroom experience. In spite of a
judge's instructions, keeping testimony and argument separate may
be difficult.28 6 The advocate-witness rule supposedly prevents such
confusion.
This rationale for the advocate-witness rule is merely a restate-
ment of some of the protect-the-client or protect-the-opposing-party
rationales. The fear that the jury might give too much weight to the
advocate-witness's argument,28 7 or too little weight to his testi-
mony,28 does not support as strong a remedy as the advocate-wit-
ness rule provides.2 89 For the same reasons that other protection-
based concerns fail to support the advocate-witness rule, this ration-
ale also falls short.
2. Faith in the System.-Another argument for the advocate-
witness rule is to preserve the jury's faith in the judicial system. This
rationale relies on the fact that jurors will trust a system that con-
forms to their expectations. They do not expect a lawyer to testify,
just as they do not expect a judge to favor one party over the other.
This argument is typical of the "unlikely scenarios" often raised
to support the need for this rule. 9 No evidence exists to show that
laywer testimony violates a juror's expectations. No evidence exists
to show that jurors believe trial lawyers are different from other at-
torneys. Finally, no evidence exists to show that jurors will lose faith
in the judicial system if the attorney testifies. The need to protect
juries from confusion or to protect jurors' faith in the system does
not justify an advocate-witness rule that interferes with the client's
right to the counsel of his choice.
286. Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350, 357 (N.D. II. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Note, supra note 99, at 142.
287. See supra notes 254-66 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 204-18 and accompanying text.
289. See Note, supra note 16, at 1394 ("[lIt is unclear whether the underlying concern
is for the trier-of-fact or the attorney and his client."). But see Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 61:502 (Apr. 14, 1984) (concern for jury confusion appears as one of the con-
cerns voiced in Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7 comment).
290. Note, supra note 16, at 1389.
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E. Protecting the Legal Profession
Rex O'Hurlihan: "You're not a good guy at all!"
Bob Barber: "I'm a lawyer, you idiot!"29
Saul Griswold: "You're still good. You can look me in the
eye and lie-like a lawyer."'2 9
These two quotes typify a common image of lawyers. Many pro-
ponents of the advocate-witness rule contend that the rule exists to
prevent such negative stereotyping.
This fifth major area of support for the advocate-witness rule,
the need to foster a healthy public image of the legal profession, is
the most pervasive of any supporting rationale for the rule."'
"[N]othing short of actual corruption can more surely discredit the
profession" than a lawyer being both advocate and witness in the
same case.29 4 The concern is for perception, whether or not there
exists any real harm for the rule to prevent. Perception, rumor, and
innuendo of shady lawyer behavior can be as damaging to the pro-
fession as true misconduct.295 "While the [legal] profession is an
honorable one, its members should not forget that even they may so
act as to lose public confidence and general respect. 29 6 This ration-
291. The closing lines of the confrontation between the two protagonists in the film Rus-
tier's Rhapsody (Paramount 1985).
292. Character's statement upon meeting his old flame, an Israeli intelligence operative,
in a made-for-TV movie adaptation of David Morrell, The Brotherhood of the Rose. This
negative statement does not appear in the corresponding scene in the novel.
293. See, e.g., 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, at 776 (the most potent and most common
reason judicially advanced); Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:504 (Apr. 14,
1984) ("the public will suspect the advocate of distorting the truth to further his client's inter-
ests"); Cherniak, The Lawyer as a Witness for His Client, 17 ALA. L. REV. 308, 309 (1965)
("violates public policy"); Cramer, supra note 127, at 824 ("most important, a lawyer must
avoid even the appearance of impropriety"); Comment, supra note 21, at 145 ("most persua-
sive argument is that respect for the profession and confidence in it will be effectively dimin-
ished"); Note, supra note 99, at 146 (preventing the dual role is "an excellent place to begin"
repairing the public's perception of the legal profession); Note, supra note 91, at 796 (primary
rationale for the rule is to avoid the perception of impropriety); Note, supra note 16, at 1367
("primarily intended to protect the legal profession from the appearance of impropriety").
294. Ferraro v. Taylor, 197 Minn. 5, 12, 265 N.W. 829, 833 (1936).
295. United States v. Crockett, 506 F.2d 759, 761 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 824 (1975). See Sutton, supra note 22, at 482 ("The fear that the public will think
lawyers will distort the truth in favor of the client, rather than any fear that lawyers do distort
the truth. ... )
296. Christensen v. United States, 90 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1937). See Walsh v. Mur-
phy, 2 Greene 227 (Iowa 1849):
[N]o respectable member of the profession, who properly appreciates his posi-
tion in society, and at the bar, will so far forget the dignity of his profession, and
his relation to the court, as to become the willing and pliant tool in the hands of
his client in the capacity of witness.
Id. at 229.
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ale concludes that enhancing the profession's image justifies the costs
to individual parties burdened by application of the rule.
I. Weaknesses of the Public Perception Rationale.-Public
perception is a concern for any profession. It is likely that the public
would perceive any witness with a stake in the outcome of litigation
as biased.2 97 From a public perception point of view, there is no rea-
son to treat litigating lawyers differently from other attorneys.
Almost every party to a civil lawsuit (and his agents) is suspect
of stretching the truth for his cause . . . . [W]e must be careful
not to accept the most cynical as the true voice of the public,
lest we accept a lack of faith in our institutions as a categorical
basis for restricting otherwise quite ethical conduct . . . . [The
rule] should not be used promiscuously as a convenient tool for
disqualification when the facts simply do not fit within the ru-
bric of other specific ethical and disciplinary rules.29
Professor Enker gives no credence to the idea that the advocate-
witness rule protects the image of the legal profession.299 The prac-
tice of an advocate testifying in a case in which he is the trial coun-
sel is not intrinsically bad.300 The majority of civil trial witnesses are
partisan. The system allows for impeachment to demonstrate their
bias to the trier of fact.301 EC 5-9, EC 5-10, and ABA Opinion 339
do not rely on this public perception rationale or even mention it as a
consideration in addressing the advocate-witness rule. a0 2
The legal profession will receive public criticism as long as it
protects unpopular causes and unpopular parties; but the education
of the public, not the creation of new ethical standards, is a more
appropriate response.3 03 The advocate-witness rule unnecessarily dis-
counts the faith of the public in American legal institutions.304 No
evidence exists to show that the public is concerned about attorneys
testifying in the same case in which they are trial counsel. Such pub-
lic concern may be only a theory that attorneys impose upon them-
297. International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1294 (2d Cir. 1975) (disput-
ing Dean Wigmore's contention that the public would think less of lawyers than other wit-
nesses merely because of their status).
298. Id. at 1294-95. See Comment, supra note 101, at 271 (agreeing that the view of
the most cynical should not dictate the bounds of ethical conduct).
299. Enker, supra note 21, at 459.
300. Id.
301. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 613.
302. See supra note 47; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 339 (1975).
303. Sutton, supra note 22, at 482.
304. Note, supra note 91, at 807.
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selves. 0 5 Without proof of public concern for this dual role practice,
imposing a rule to prevent such concern is unnecessary and unwise,
and it amounts to creating a presumption that lawyers lack integ-
rity.306 "The rule is self perpetuating: it is unseemly for an attorney
. . . [who] is trial counsel in the case to testify because there is a
rule of ethics to the contrary."" 7
In addition to this general refutation of the public perception
rationale, certain case-specific facts further undercut the need to
protect the legal profession's image. This rationale is weaker when
the attorney and client have a long-standing relationship because the
advocate-witness rule will not erase the perception that the lawyer-
witness might lie.308 Corporate counsel are also subject to continued
impeachability, even if they surrender trial counsel duties. 309
The public perception rationale falters completely when the
judge is the trier of fact. The public who might observe this conduct
by the lawyer-witness is usually the jury.310 "It is considerably less
clear whether members of the public who are not jurors have any
knowledge of limitations of an attorney's courtroom behavior
.... ,311 Removing the public removes the adverse perception.
Lawyers should be aware of public perception of the profession,
but the advocate-witness rule should not apply when other specific
ethical and disciplinary rules do not apply.31 The general public
probably does not have knowledge of the parameters of appropriate
attorney courtroom behavior. Specifically, the public probably does
not realize current ethical rules proscribe advocate-witness testimony
in many instances.3 13 Thus, a public perception that lawyers violate
ethical rules by testifying is unlikely.
Application of the advocate-witness rule can adversely affect
public perception of the legal profession. For example, it can give the
opponent a tactical advantage,314 and so it is at least as great a dis-
service to the reputation of the legal profession and the judicial sys-
305. Note, supra note 16, at 1391.
306. Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 905 (1978).
307. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 613.
308. Wydick, supra note 22, at 665.
309. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 615.
310. Note, supra note 16, at 1390.
311. Id.
312. Wydick, supra note 22, at 665 (Professor Wydick uses a colorful metaphor to make
his point: "Do ,not bend over in your neighbor's cantaloupe patch, even to tie your shoe.").
Example of other rules that might apply would be privilege rules.
313. Note, supra note 16, at 1390.
314. See infra notes 400-29 and accompanying text.
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tern as allowing the trial counsel to testify. One public perception
that does exist is that the law is replete with technicalities that some-
times produce unfair results. Barring a witness from testifying be-
cause he is the trial attorney may impress the public as such a tech-
nicality. As long as the witness's testimony is consistent with other
ethical concerns and evidentiary rules, allowing the lawyer's testi-
mony may even enhance public perception of the legal profession.:
One major problem the public perception rationale faces is that
it represents a misalignment of priorities by the legal profession: ap-
pearance over justice. Misapplication of the advocate-witness rule
"will often result in achieving propriety in form only, and sometimes
will result in a miscarriage of justice. '15
The mere existence of the rule can reduce the chances for a just
result in the case. The advocate-witness rule may force an attorney
to choose a less desirable course of action. For example, the attorney
may be reluctant to pursue an approach that would possibly expose
him to testifying and thus to disqualification.16 "[Aln effective ethi-
cal code should be more concerned .in this instance with attaining
justice than with combatting appearances of impropriety."3 17 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seems to be the only court to
address the definition of "appearance of professional impropriety"
directly. An activity is improper if it "affects the public view of the
judicial system or the integrity of the court, and is serious enough to
outweigh the parties' interest in counsel of their own choice."31 8
Critically applying this test to allegations that an attorney's testi-
mony adversely affects the legal profession will severely undermine
the purported public perception rationale for the advocate-witness
rule.
The advocate-witness rule has existed for over 150 years, and
has been codified in the United States for over 80 years. If the rule
were going to purify the public image of lawyers, it should have done
so by now. For example, quotes from contemporary movies, while
not as persuasive as a scientifically conducted survey of the public,
315. Sutton, supra note 22, at 497. The author uses United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d
617 (7th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 312 (1961) as an example to illustrate
his point. In that case, the defense lawyer wanted to testify as to juror misconduct in support
of a motion for new trial. The Clancy court refused to allow the testimony and denied the
motion. Id. at 486.
316. Comment, supra note 101, at 272-73.
317. Id.
318. Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int'l v. Style Cos., 760 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1985)
(citing In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d
1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982)).
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tend to counter the theory that the rule effectively serves that pur-
pose. There is no evidence to show that attorney testimony encour-
ages any negative stereotyping of the legal profession.
2. Public Perception v. Client Interests.-An additional prob-
lem with the public perception rationale for the advocate-witness
rule is that it relies on "unsubstantiated and incalculable fear of
public criticism . . . [which] obscures the often substantial burdens
that the rule imposes on the client." '19 That the fear of public criti-
cism is largely speculative may explain why, as of 1970, most courts
believed that excluding defense counsel testimony or demanding
withdrawal would only penalize the criminal defendant a20 as opposed
to serving any great public purpose. Proper priorities require an ef-
fective ethical code concerned more with attaining justice than with
avoiding appearances of impropriety.3 21 The advocate-witness rule
does not permit proper concern for the costs to the client and the loss
of justice associated with its application.
F. Protecting the Judicial System
The judicial system is composed of a judge, a trier of fact, the
parties and their attorneys, the witnesses, and a few other actors, all
of whom have roles to play. Proponents of the advocate-witness rule
argue that the rule prevents unnecessary disruption of the judicial
system associated with the trial counsel filling more than one role.
1. Preserves the Traditional Structure.-"Experience shows
that the adversary system functions best when the role of Judge, of
counsel, of witness is sharply separated [sic]. '32 2 With this state-
ment, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit succinctly set forth
this rationale for the advocate-witness rule. Allowing a trial counsel
319. Note, supra note 16, at 1393. The high cost of the advocate witness rule to the
client is addressed in detail supra notes 225-42 and accompanying text.
320. Comment, supra note 21, at 135.
321. Comment, supra note 101, at 273. Even some authors who support the rule recog-
nize that the rule will be unfair in some situations. See, e.g., Note, supra note 91, at 808.
322. Inglett & Co. v. Everglades Fertilizer Co., 255 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1958). See
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:505-06 (Apr. 14, 1984), which stated:
[O]rdinary procedural safeguards designed to give the parties a full and fair
hearing become problematic. For example, the familiar mechanics of question-
and-answer interrogation become impossible. The rule excluding witnesses from
the courtroom may be invoked, yet the advocate-witness obviously must be al-
lowed to remain. The advocate who testifies places himself in the position of
being able to argue his own credibility . . . . Any mixing of those roles inevita-
bly diminishes the effectiveness of the entire system . . . . [and] also disrupts
the normal balance of judicial machinery.
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to also act as witness in the same case tends to disrupt the normal
flow of the trial.123 The argument continues that disqualification will
therefore better serve the ends of justice by protecting the judicial
system. 24
This reason for the advocate-witness rule rests on the assump-
tion that there is an intrinsic conflict between the roles of advocate
and witness.325
Argument is argument. You cannot help paying regard to their
arguments if they are good. If it were testimony you might dis-
regard it, if you knew that it were purchased. There is a beauti-
ful image in Bacon upon this subject: testimony is like an arrow
shot from a long bow: the force of it depends on the strength of
the hand that draws it. Argument is like an arrow from a cross
bow which has equal force though shot by a child.3 26
The argument that the advocate-witness rule guards the integ-
rity of the judicial system is flawed. "Two commonly presented fic-
tions" are that witnesses are to be neutral observers of fact and that
the advocate's role is antithetical with that of a witness.327 A good
lawyer acts as a witness as he prepares documents, reviews actions,
and monitors the conduct of his client.32 8 Denying an attorney, who
did this work to prevent successful suits against his client, the right
to also defend that client in court would be tantamount to enforcing
the advocate-witness rule by "establish[ing] a system of barristers
and solicitors that would divide the functions of general and trial
representation." 2 9 Even the British are reevaluating this bifurcated
system. 330
Another basic flaw in the protect-the-system rationale is that it
assumes that applying the rule does not hurt the system. Enforcing
323. Christensen v. United States, 90 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1937).
324. United States v. Siegner, 498 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
325. Cannon Airways, Inc. v. Franklin Holdings Corp., 669 F. Supp. 96, 99 (D. Del.
1987).
326. Enker, supra note 21, at 463 (quoting Sir Hartley Shawcross, The Functions and
Responsibilities of an Advocate, in 2 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Benja-
min N. Cardozo Memorial Lectures 1941-1970, at 631, 638 (1972)).
327. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 613.
328. Id.
329. Note, supra note 16, at 1396. An example of such bifurcated responsibilities in
practice, though not apparently due to advocate-witness considerations, is the United States
Army's handling of disputes arising with civilian businesses with which it contracts. Generally,
an attorney located at the contract site provides legal advice concerning formation and admin-
istration of the contract. When contract disputes arise requiring resolution through litigation, a
Contract Appeals Division attorney, operating from offices in Washington, D.C., assumes trial
responsibility for that case.
330. Garcia, Hard Cases. Strong Cure, TiME, Feb. 13, 1989, at 53.
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the rule may indeed disrupt the system; for instance, when opposing
counsel makes a motion to disqualify a trial counsel on the basis of
the advocate-witness rule primarily, if not solely, to gain a tactical
advantage."3 1
This rationale also confuses its priorities. The rationale of pro-
tecting the system "assumes that the structure of the system is para-
mount to its essential purpose. A litigant's right to call relevant wit-
nesses and to present a complete case should not be sacrificed for the
sake of trial convenience."33
2. The Danger of Improper Argument.-Another rationale for
the advocate-witness rule contends that applying the rule precludes
improper argument in the form of testimony and avoids the inherent
advocate-witness role conflict. A witness testifies to what he believes.
A lawyer's belief in his argument is irrelevant.333 There exists a dan-
ger that an attorney will not be able to keep advocacy out of his
testimony,3 3' so the argument continues.
Advocates can create "facts" not otherwise in evidence in the
jurors' minds through their arguments.335 Advocates who have wit-
nessed relevant events are more likely to create such improper
"facts" in the mind of the trier of fact. Such attorney-created
"facts" may or may not be true, but since they are not in evidence,
they are impermissible in argument. Proponents argue that the advo-
cate-witness rule forecloses an opportunity for such improper argu-
ment. "The prohibition against appearing as both advocate and wit-
ness eliminates the opportunity to mix law and fact." 3 6
Improperly creating such "facts" is not limited to the closing
argument. The potential exists any time the lawyer-witness speaks.
United States v. Cunningham33 7 illustrates an application of the ad-
vocate-witness rule to foreclose an attorney from the opportunity to
improperly create "facts" during cross-examination. In this case,
plaintiff's counsel announced plans to call the opposing lawyer's sec-
331. MacArthur v. Bank of N.Y., 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Tactical
advantage aspects of the advocate-witness rule are discussed infra notes 400-29 and accompa-
nying text.
332. Comment, supra note 101, at 271.
333. Enker, supra note 21, at 463.
334. Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1984). See also Cramer,
supra note 127, at 824 ("Because partisan interest motivates the advocate, he may not be a
completely objective witness.").
335. Levin & Levy, supra note 259, at 155.
336. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:506 (Apr. 14, 1984).
337. United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 951 (1984).
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retary on a collateral issue of the authenticity of a memorandum for
record.338 The plaintiff's counsel also made a motion to disqualify the
defendant's attorney on the basis that his testimony would be neces-
sary "to rebut, corroborate, or explain" his secretary's testimony re-
garding what defendant's counsel had said to her, an issue tangen-
tially related to the memorandum.339
In disqualifying the defendant's counsel, the court acknowl-
edged that the defendant, who was also a lawyer, knew the value of
his counsel's testimony and waived it. But this waiver did not win the
motion for the defendant; the court worried that defendant's counsel
could not "suggest one of the [innocent] possibilities [for what the
secretary heard] even on common sense grounds, directly or indi-
rectly, without implicitly testifying as an unsworn witness." '4 In the
court's opinion, a potential witness-counsel could improperly testify
by merely asking a question related to the area to which he could
testify."' A nonwitness counsel could ask the same question with no
ill effects to the system. Another court concluded that the same
question colored by the witness potential of the examining lawyer
could have such an unfairly prejudicial impact upon the jury, re-
gardless of the witness's answer, that such impact warranted disqual-
ification of the potential witness trial counsel.342 .The Peng Court
stated that allowing the lawyer to stay on the case but not testify
was actually worse than allowing him to stay on the case and tes-
tify.343 In the latter instance, the lawyer could then be cross-ex-
amined and impeached.
3 44
The danger of improper argument may increase when the trial
counsel has personal knowledge that would make him a relevant wit-
ness. But this risk increases any time a trial attorney is familiar with
338. Id. at 1069.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1074-75. See United States v. Peng, 602 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 766
F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1985). In Peng, three members of a law firm were among those who attended
a meeting relevant to a trial at which one of the members was the trial counsel.
It is clear that even if [the trial attorney] does not testify . . . there remains the
danger that [when he cross-examined his partners or gave a closing argument he
would be able to put his version of events before the jury and] he would be
implicitly testifying as to his version of the conversation . . . .Since as an un-
sworn witness he would not be subject to cross-examination or explicit impeach-
ment, the interest to be protected by the Disciplinary Rules would be even more
seriously eroded than if [he] appeared as a witness.
Id. at 301.
341. United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1074 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 951 (1984).
342. Peng, 602 F. Supp. at 301.
343. Id. at 304.
344. Id. at 301.
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facts not in evidence.348 Attorneys almost always are aware of many
facts that do not enter into evidence for a variety of reasons. There is
no reason to presume that lawyers who testify will argue facts not in
evidence more often than lawyers who do not testify.346 If the advo-
cate's argument strays from the record, his opponent may request
appropriate relief from the court, or may possibly obtain a
reversal. 347
The existence of the advocate-witness rule may actually lead to
an increased opportunity for improper argument. The argument is
only improper because the evidence the attorney has is not part of
the record. It is not part of the record, assuming it is otherwise ad-
missible, because the advocate-witness rule blocks the lawyer's testi-
mony on one hand and participation as trial counsel on the other.
Eliminate the advocate-witness rule and the lawyer may testify if no
other evidentiary concern precludes the testimony. The improper ar-
gument rationale largely disappears if the advocate-witness rule does
not apply. 8 8
3. The Danger of Frivolous Litigation.-Another limited ra-
tionale for applying the advocate-witness rule is to protect the sys-
tem from frivolous litigation by pro se attorney litigants. The trial
counsel could not be both advocate and witness unless he proceeds
pro se. Denial of attorney's fees would remedy a situation in which
"a lawyer representing himself or herself lacks the objectivity neces-
sary to provide a check against groundless or frivolous litigation. '
An advocate-party-witness only receives attorney's fees if he
prevails. If he prevails, the litigation was not groundless. 3 0 There-
fore, this possible rationale for the advocate-witness rule is without
merit.
4. Avoid Attorney Credibility Contest.-Another alleged
threat to the judicial system avoided by the advocate-witness rule is
345. Sutton, supra note 22, at 480-81.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 481.
348. Wydick, supra note 22, at 663-64.
349. This rationale appears from the party opposing the advocate-witness in Duncan v.
Poythress, 750 F.2d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir.), vacated, 756 F.2d 1481 (1985). The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, rendered essentially the same decision as the
vacated opinion in Duncan v. Poythress, 777 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1129 (1986). Interestingly, the dissent in this en banc decision cites in excess of twenty
dictionary definitions of "attorney," and each imposes a requirement of acting "for another."
777 F.2d at 1518-21 (Rodney, J., dissenting).
350. Duncan, 750 F.2d at 1545.
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the degeneration of the trial into a credibility contest between oppos-
ing counsel.351 In other words, the argument of the attorneys "would
be judged in an improper frame of reference ' 352 if they had also
testified as witnesses.
This rationale is merely a restatement of the theories that the
opposing counsel requires protection from a famous advocate35 3 or
that the jury requires protection from confusion of the advocate and
witness roles. 354 For the same reasons it was unpersuasive in those
contexts, it fails here.
5. Sequestration Problems.-Sequestration of witnesses is an-
other supposed systemic problem that the rule averts. "The rule ex-
cluding witnesses from the courtroom may be invoked, yet the advo-
cate-witness obviously must be allowed to remain." ''  This basis
alone is insufficient to support a court's enforcement of the advocate-
witness rule. Not all witnesses are excluded from the courtroom,
even though the opposing counsel requests sequestration. Experts are
allowed to remain in the courtroom to assist the trier of fact, 356 and
selective inclusion of certain witnesses is not limited to experts.
357
In cross-examination, opposing counsel can exploit the fact that
the advocate-witness was present throughout other witnesses' testi-
mony, and the trier of fact may discredit the attorney's testimony on
this basis alone. The advocate-witness rule cannot stand on this se-
questration problem for its support.
Striving to protect the system with the advocate-witness rule
might produce "more harm than good by requiring the client and the
judicial system to sacrifice more than the value of the presumed ben-
efits."35 The advocate-witness rule overlaps other available devices
that protect the judicial system, such as cross-examination and reme-
dies for improper argument. Where those other prophylactic devices
do not reach, the advocate-witness rule is unnecessary.
The many arguments advanced to support the advocate-witness
rule are superficially impressive. When courts combine several of the
bases for the advocate-witness rule to support their denial of advo-
351. Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988).
352. Enker, supra note 21, at 464.
353. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
355. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:505-06 (Apr. 14, 1984).
356. United States v. Gordon, 27 M.J. 331, 332 (C.M.A. 1989).
357. Id.
358. International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting
brief submitted by the Connecticut Bar Association).
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cate testimony, the result appears to be just. But the strength of each
rationale fades in the light of reason and under close examination.
Though the legion of rationales for the advocate-witness rule seems
impressive, a truly necessary rule would require fewer and less inge-
nious justifications.359
IV. Problems with the Rule in General
There are many problems with the advocate-witness rule that
transcend the attempts to codify it. Its relatively short history has
generated little precedent. a60 A lack of clear supporting rationales
makes codification difficult because the codes have no clearly defined
goals.36 1 These flawed attempts at codification lead to divergent ap-
plications of the rule. 62 Lawyers rarely deliberately flaunt ethical
rules, including the advocate-witness rule. As a general rule, ethical
violations result from uncertain standards.36 3
The problems with the advocate-witness rule originate in a rule
without firm roots. The problems include, for example, a conflict
with the right to counsel, the effect on the attorney-client relation-
ship,364 and the abuse by opposing counsel of an ethical rule as a
tactical weapon. These problems persist despite efforts to codify and
apply this uncertain rule. 65 The advocate-witness rule may be neces-
359. A trial advocacy truism states: "If the case is weak on the facts, pound on the law.
If it is weak on the law, pound on the facts. If it is weak on the law and the facts, pound on
the table." The multitude of rationales for the advocate-witness rule may be an example of its
proponents "pounding on the table."
360. Courts have been active in this area only since the advent of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. But see Note, supra note 16, at 1400 ("The advocate-witness rule
has enjoyed a long but less than venerable career.").
361. Sutton, supra note 22, at 477 (There is reason to believe that the reasons for the
rule's existence have been forgotten.). See Enker, supra note 21, at 456 ("[D]espite this unani-
mously vigorous condemnation of the practice of appearing in dual roles, the literature has
shown remarkable uncertainty over the reasons for the rule.").
362. See Sutton, supra note 22:
An important reason for the existence of a code of ethics is its educational value
to the bar. To be educational, the code must be reasonably complete and explan-
atory so that lawyers and courts may rely safely upon it. Canon 19, by requiring
advocates to take action which in some circumstances is not truly consistent with
a lawyer's responsibility, victimizes courts, attorneys and clients.
Id. at 488. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility caused even more confusion than
Canon 19. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are too new to have established whether
they will meet Professor Sutton's call for clarity.
363. McCown, Ethical Problems in Probate Matters, 39 NEB. L. REV. 343, 348 (1960)
("The great majority of ethical violations do not occur deliberately, but are rather the uninten-
tional consequences of an unrecognized problem.").
364. Id. at 623 (The advocate-witness rule is an illustration of an ethics system that
ignores the client and "speaks, out of habit, of legal practice as courtroom practice.").
365. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 621 ("Courts and legislatures have accepted
and implemented [the rule] without scrutinizing either the rationales that supposedly underlie
it, or any empirical data showing that the rule is important to the standing or reputation of the
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sary under some circumstances, but any decision to keep it should
not ignore its serious negative aspects.
A. Right to Counsel
1. The Accrual of the Right.-One difficulty attorneys have
with the advocate-witness rule is that the right to counsel in criminal
cases attaches relatively late in some attorney-client relationships.
The right to counsel under the sixth amendment attaches at or after
the initiation of adversary proceedings.366 The issuance of an indict-
ment marks the beginning of adversary proceedings for the purpose
of a criminal defendant's attorney rights."6 '
The problem with this definition of "initiation of adversary pro-
ceedings" co-existing with the advocate-witness rule is that the state
can call a suspect's attorney to testify before a grand jury. The sub-
stance of this testimony may be against the interests of the client,
but may address matters not within the attorney-client privilege.
Should an indictment issue on matters to which the attorney testi-
fied, that attorney ought to know that he is likely to be a state's
witness. The advocate-witness rule then precludes him from ac-
cepting the trial counsel position in such a case, even if conflict of
interest concerns are satisfied.a'
Courts tend to discount the fact that the advocate-witness rule,
in tandem with grand jury testimony, might deprive a client of his
chosen advocate for trial:
Before disqualification can even be contemplated, the attorney's
testimony must incriminate his client; the grand jury must in-
dict; the government must go forward with the prosecution of
the indictment; and, ultimately, the attorney must be advised he
will be called as a trial witness against his client. As a court, we
decline to speculate that all those events will occur . . . .Dis-
profession.").
366. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984).
367. Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424, 1429 (9th Cir. 1988). See Gunther v.
United States, 230 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1956). In Gunther, after indictment, the state wanted
to call the lawyer that the accused had released to testify as to the accused's sanity. The court
was not only concerned with privilege problems, but stated that to allow the state to proceed in
such a fashion "would also invade an accused's right to counsel in the trial of the criminal
charge." Id. at 223.
368. If the attorney fits within an exception, he may avoid the advocate-witness rule.
Many issues to which the attorney may testify before a grand jury would not violate the con-
flict of interest rules. For example, he may supply dates of employment and amount of the fee
for services performed. Testifying to these same issues at trial, however, might violate the
advocate-witness rule, particularly in those courts that apply the rule rigidly. See, e.g., Tornay,
840 F.2d at 1430; In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
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qualification is not inevitable. 369
If the advocate-witness rule did not exist, or the right to counsel ac-
crued to the client earlier in the process, then grand jury testimony
would not provide the prosecutor with a tool to remove opposing
counsel from the trial counsel role.
In both civil and criminal cases, attorneys cannot ignore the risk
of their possible disqualification. With the advocate-witness rule lim-
iting a client's choice of trial counsel before that right to counsel
even accrues, a lawyer may tailor his approach to a client's situation
to preserve his ability to try the case. This impact of the rule causes
the attorney to consider such factors as "the value of the firm's gen-
eral representation of the client, the detriment to the client of the
firm's disqualification from the particular litigation, and the impact
of and harm to the attorney-client relationship."370 None of these
factors has anything to do with justice or the merits of the case.
They represent only transaction costs associated with the presence of
the advocate-witness rule.
This fear of the advocate-witness rule can harm the judicial sys-
tem, as well as the client and the opposing party. By choosing not to
take certain actions or not to become personally involved to protect
his client's counsel choice, a lawyer might actually reduce the
chances of settlement of the issue. 71
"The thrust of [the advocate-witness rule], quite simply, was
that the lawyer's efforts on his client's behalf should be exercised
independently and without compromise to that end." '3 72 This goal is
admirable, but the advocate-witness rule actually forces the attorney
to consider compromising his client's interests in the merits of his
action well before trial. An attorney balancing the better action for
his client against the possibility that the client may lose his represen-
tation is balancing the client's legal interest against the inconve-
nience and economic harm that the advocate-witness rule may im-
pose in the case. An attorney who is primarily concerned for his fee
might actually harm a client's case.
Concern for the advocate-witness rule does not disappear once
the litigation begins. The rule could present an advocate with a di-
lemma as he determines what evidence to introduce at trial. On one
hand, some evidence could lay a foundation for the opposing counsel
369. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, 781 F.2d at 245.
370. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 617.
371. Id. at 618.
372. United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110, 117 (C.M.A. 1988).
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to try to force his opponent to withdraw and testify, which could
adversely affect the client financially and at trial. On the other hand,
withholding such evidence could reduce the client's chances of suc-
cess.3"' The less sympathetic the jurisdiction is toward the hardship
that disqualification would impose on the client, the more important
the advocate-witness rule considerations become.37 4 The attorney is,
therefore, forced to consider those matters unrelated to the just out-
come of the trial.3 75 The real issues in the case pale commensurately,
adversely affecting the client and reducing the opportunity for a cor-
rect result on the merits of the case.
Through all of these calculations, the attorney must remain
aware of possible ineffective assistance allegations each time he
makes a decision involving the advocate-witness rule. A decision not
to testify could be construed as ineffective assistance. 76 An attor-
ney's failure to withdraw when listed by the opposing counsel as a
possible witness could form the basis for an appeal alleging ineffec-
tiveness.3 77 Furthermore, his advice to his client on advocate-witness
issues could draw the attorney's competency into question. 378 Some
courts believe that the attorney would use the advocate-witness rule
to build incompetency into the record deliberately. 379 These sorts of
concerns could lead an attorney to back away from the edge of zeal-
ous representation to avoid allegations of incompetency.
2. Importance of the Right to Counsel.-The attorney-client
relationship is often important long before the right to that attorney
accrues to the client. Courts should give greater deference to the at-
torney choices clients make long before the trial.
The Court of Military Appeals gives more weight than other
courts to allowing a party the counsel of his choice, as opposed to a
mere right to competent counsel. "Defense counsel are not fungible
items. Although an accused is not fully and absolutely entitled to
counsel of choice, he is absolutely entitled to retain an established
373. See Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int'l v. Style Cos., 760 F.2d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir.
1985).
374. See Sutton, supra note 22, at 487. See also Baca, 27 M.J. at 119 (holding that
such a severance of the attorney-client relationship should only be for good cause, and the dual
role of witness and advocate is not good cause per se).
375. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
376. United States ex rel. Sheldon Elec. Co., v. Blackhawk Heating, 423 F. Supp. 486,
490 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
377. Lyons v. United States, 325 F.2d 370, 376 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
969 (1964).
378. See Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 603.
379. See, e.g., United States v. Siegner, 498 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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relationship with counsel in the absence of demonstrated good
cause." ' Though the Baca case addressed a situation long past the
civilian equivalent of indictment, that court's words should reach be-
yond the post-indictment criminal justice situation. No client should
be stripped of his attorney in the absence of demonstrated good
cause.
3 8 1
Many courts and commentators share the Court of Military Ap-
peals' concern.382 "Important Sixth Amendment right to counsel
principles are at issue in this situation. [The defendant] has an un-
questioned right to self-representation . . . . A corollary to that is
representation by counsel of his own choosing."3'83
3. Resolving the Conflict.-The tension between the advocate-
witness rule and the usual practice of allowing a party to choose his
trial advocate is obvious. One approach courts take to resolving this
conflict is to rely on the fact that the right to counsel does not equate
to a right to counsel of choice. 8 4
Other courts take a more enlightened approach and try to pre-
serve a client's choice of counsel. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated, "Merely requiring a defendant's lawyer to tes-
tify does not alone constitute a material interference with his func-
tion as an advocate or operate to deprive the accused of a fair
trial."385 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has proposed
a balancing test. "[T]he trial judge may rule in limine that the [ad-
vocate's testimony] is not admissible, perhaps because its probative
force does not justify a resulting disqualification of counsel." '86
Thus, ruling the testimony inadmissible forecloses the advocate-wit-
ness rule issue and leaves the decision to withdraw and testify with
the lawyer.
The Court of Military Appeals has announced a drastic reduc-
380. United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110, 119 (C.M.A. 1988).
381. Suni, Subpoenas to Criminal Defense Lawyers: A Proposal for Limits, 65 OR. L.
REV. 215, 225, n.30 (1986) (The United States Supreme Court has never expressly endorsed
the concept of a right to counsel of choice. Instead, the majority of that court views the right
to an attorney as protecting the right to a fair trial.).
382. Cramer, supra note 127, at 828.
383. In Re American Cable Publications, Inc., 768 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1985).
Although this case involved an attorney-defendant who wanted his partner to represent him at
trial, this language seems applicable to any party.
384. United States v. Siegner, 498 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
385. United States v. Freeman, 519 F.2d 67, 68 (9th Cir. 1975).
386. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986). Such a ruling based on the equity power of the court is
analogous to granting the opposing counsel's Federal Rule of Evidence 403 motion in advance
of trial, and yields the same result: The advocate may not testify until he withdraws.
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tion in the reach of the advocate-witness rule: "When [advocate tes-
timony] is on a procedural, administrative, or collateral matter, he or
she ordinarily need not be disqualified as counsel. 3 87 The court has
reversed lower courts that applied the advocate-witness rule to dis-
qualify defense counsel who testified on issues of competency to
stand trial388 and speedy trial.389
Although the right to counsel does not mean a right to a partic-
ular counsel, the judicial system normally contemplates a party hir-
ing the counsel he selects. The advocate-witness rule erodes this free-
dom of choice. The Court of Military Appeals has effectively
narrowed the advocate-witness rule when the application of the rule
would deprive a defendant of his chosen defense counsel. Other
courts are trimming the advocate-witness rule's reach. Only elimi-
nating the rule would completely restore a client's right to proceed to
trial with the lawyer of choice.
B. Effect of the Attorney-Client Relationship
In criminal cases, the timing of the accrual of the attorney right
creates a gap between the client's right to his attorney and the grand
jury. This gap, in tandem with the advocate-witness rule, allows a
prosecutor to terminate the attorney-client relationship before indict-
ment by making the lawyer a witness for the state. The adverse im-
pact of this prosecutorial power pervades the attorney-client relation-
ship. Pre-indictment risks plus the advocate-witness rule "drive a
wedge between attorney and client; to deprive criminal defendants of
all confidence in the efficacy of their right to counsel; and even to
deprive defendants of their counsel of choice, through reconstitution
of that counsel as a witness for the prosecution." ' Because the right
to a defense lawyer does not accrue until adversary actions begin,
the client's freedom to disclose matters to his lawyer before that time
is chilled by the potential reach of a government subpoena.391
In civil cases there is no similar timing issue, but the advocate-
witness rule itself serves to impede attorney performance:
387. United States v. Cook, 27 M.J. 212, 214 n.3 (C.M.A. 1988).
388. United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110, 119 (C.M.A. 1988).
389. Cook, 27 M.J. at 216.
390. Hearings on S. 3274, Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 84-85 (1976) (statement of Melvin B. Lewis),
quoted in Suni, supra note 381, at 223 n.23.
391. Worse would be government access to an attorney released by a client. In Gunther
v. United States, 230 F.2d 222, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the government tried to use the defend-
ant's former defense attorney to prove the defendant's sanity, but the court refused this evi-
dence on grounds of privilege and right to counsel.
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[T]he rule purposelessly interferes with the lawyer-client rela-
tionship and inhibits legitimate action by counsel in the planning
and preventative stages when the transaction is taking place,
and throughout the -litigation process. The rule unnecessarily
complicates counsel's decision in representing a client, since a
thoughtful attorney now has to keep in mind that as a result of
any action he might take he could become a participant witness
and thus disqualify [himself] .... 39'
Large multi-service law firms are likely to be involved in many as-
pects of the client's personal and professional life. The nature of such
firms increases the chance that a client's trial counsel will also be a
witness.393 As a result, the advocate-witness rule impedes the law-
yer's ability to offer effective, cost-efficient legal services to the
client."9
The advocate-witness rule weakens the attorney-client relation-
ship, and may prevent ethically permissible relationships from form-
ing. In addition to affecting the first lawyer's pretrial performance,
fees promised or paid might inhibit the client's hiring a second law-
yer if the rule is applied. 395 Similarly, the possibility that the rule
may apply might cause the first lawyer the client approached to re-
fuse employment he ethically could have accepted. Such an overly
cautious application of the rule and its exceptions would unnecessa-
rily deprive the client of his counsel choice.396
Client consent to the risks associated with advocate testimony is
often posed as a way to soften the harsh impact of the advocate-
witness rule. 3 7 Generally, if the rule must exist, this suggestion has
merit, but client consent does not remove the chilling effect of the
advocate-witness rule on attorney-client relations. "The very act of
seeking consent, which requires that the attorney explain to the cli-
ent the nature of the potential conflict and its effect on the attorney's
own interest, may itself create suspicion and drive a 'wedge' between
the attorney and the client."3 " In the civil context, the client is
equally unlikely to derive confidence from the attorney's explanation
of the risks of impeachment and impaired advocacy.
"The attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, as
well as the sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of
392. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 598.
393. Note, supra note 16, at 1384.
394. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 617.
395. Note, supra note 16, at 1386.
396. Id.
397. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 622.
398. Suni, supra note 381, at 236 n.91.
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counsel and the ethical mandates of confidentiality, competence, and
loyalty, all serve to preserve and foster [the attorney-client] relation-
ship."3'99 The advocate-witness rule stifles the relationship these mea-
sures exist to nurture.
C. The Rule as a Tactical Weapon
Disqualifying an opposing counsel can significantly improve a
party's position in litigation"°0 because a new counsel may not be as
good as the first attorney or simply because of the delay associated
with resolving such an issue. As a result, the client may withdraw his
cause of action. 401 Furthermore, any additional cost and delay may
force a favorable settlement.4 z The advocate-witness rule is a means
to gain this advantage by forcing the opposing counsel from the case.
1. Tactical Use Exists.-One court has stated that "counsel
can approach the [advocate-witness rule] as another arrow in his
quiver of trial tactics. 40 3 Other courts have also reported the tacti-
cal use of the advocate-witness rule.40 4 "Because the rule is applica-
ble and the court, as enforcer, is present, the tactical value of the
rule flowers when a dispute enters the litigation context. °4 0 5 Tactical
use of the rule is widespread.406 Increased tactical use results in in-
creased cost to both the client and the judicial system.40 7
399. Id. at 227-28.
400. Note, supra note 91, at 807 ("The rule provides a delay tactic for the opposition
.... If counsel wishes to delay the trial, he may move to disqualify his opponent on less than
legitimate grounds."). See also Note, supra note 16, at 1385 ("If counsel wishes to delay
adjudication on the merits, therefore, he may be tempted to move to disqualify his opponent on
spurious grounds."); Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:507 (Apr. 14, 1984)
("[T]he provisions of DR 5-102 of the ABA Model Code frequently have been employed as
tactical measures to disrupt an opposing party's preparation for litigation.").
401. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
402. Wydick, supra note 22, at 673 ("Through a motion to disqualify opposing counsel,
such a litigant can put off an impending trial and often saddle the opponent with enormous
added expense.").
403. Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp.
1348, 1354 (D. Colo. 1976).
404. See. e.g., Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350, 359-60 (N.D. Ill. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988); Cannon Airways v. Franklin Holdings
Corp., 669 F. Supp. 96, 100 (D. Del. 1987) (The rule is "susceptible to use as a tactical
measure to disrupt an opposing party's preparation for trial."); Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman
Brewing Co., 610 F. Supp. 1319, 1321 (D. Del. 1985) ("The attempt by an opposing party to
disqualify the other side's counsel must be viewed as a part of the tactics of an adversary
proceeding."), affid, 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523
F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein, J., concurring)).
405. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 619.
406. Note, supra note 16, at 1385.
407. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 621. The longer a court waits to rule on such a
motion, for example until after discovery, but then applies the rule rigidly, the greater the
costs inflicted. See id. at 605.
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2. The Role of the "Substantial Hardship" Exception.-Both
the Model Code and the Model Rules allow an exception to the ad-
vocate-witness rule when disqualification of counsel would work a
substantial hardship to the client. "This [substantial hardship] ex-
ception could work to alleviate the use of [disqualification] as a tac-
tical weapon because an attempt to have opposing counsel disquali-
fied is most likely to occur when that counsel is for some reason
irreplaceable."' 0 8 If courts read this exception broadly, it could serve
to limit tactical use of the advocate-witness rule. Most courts have
not so construed the substantial hardship exception of either codifi-
cation."0 9 The prevailing view "plays right into the hands of a liti-
gant who wants to delay and harass. 14 10 As currently applied by
courts, the "substantial hardship" exception does not prevent tactical
use of the advocate-witness rule.
3. Timing the Tactical Use.-Because "a client may be
threatened with the loss of his counsel as early as pretrial discovery,
and as late as the day set for trial or even during trial,"" 1 tactical
uses of the rule reach beyond delaying the litigation." 2 New counsel
may be unobtainable because of expense, and the cost of defending
the motion to disqualify may be quite high. While the advocate de-
fends the motion, he is not attending to the merits of the case. 4 s The
disqualification motion can increase cost and delay by opening new
discovery areas that focus on whether the attorney should be a wit-
ness. 41 Attorneys may also avoid raising the disqualification motion
in the hope that the advocate-witness will be more easily im-
peached.4 5 Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated a concern that counsel might not make the motion at trial in
408. MacArthur v. Bank of N.Y., 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
409. See supra notes 126-49, 193-202 and accompanying text.
410. Wydick, supra note 22, at 673. Professor Wydick noted that "[t]he opportunities
for delay and harassment were aggravated in those federal circuits that formerly allowed an
interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to disqualify the opponent's counsel. See
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), overruling Silver Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc). But the Supreme Court
put an end to such interlocutory appeals in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S.
368 (1981)." Id. at 673-74 n.ll0.
411. Note, supra note 16, at 1374. The author cites cases illustrating each of these uses.
412. Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 619.
413. Id. at 620.
414. Id. The authors point out that discovery "would be a perfect vehicle for harassing
the opposing firm by taking depositions of all attorneys involved, in the hope of discovering at
least one potential witness." Id. Opening discovery into such an area could result in disputes
over privilege and work product that could dramatically slow the proceedings. The Model
Rules largely negate this tactic by refusing to disqualify an entire firm when one member of
that firm will be a witness. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
415. Id.
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order to save it for "post facto" attacks on adverse judgments. 16
Tactical timing issues benefit not only the attorney opposing the
advocate-witness. One federal district court appropriately feared
"deliberate abuse by defendants and their attorneys, who may seek
to avoid disqualification in cases of conflict of interest in the hope of
later seeking reversal of a conviction or withdrawal of a guilty
plea." 4"
4. Prosecutor's Tool.-The prosecutor can separate a defend-
ant from his chosen trial counsel through use of the advocate-witness
rule." 8 Such action need not terminate the attorney-client relation-
ship to adversely affect it. This prosecutorial weapon is so powerful
that the American Bar Association, in a resolution passed by the
Criminal Justice Section and approved by the House of Delegates,
stated that prosecutors "shall not subpoena .. .an attorney to a
grand jury without prior judicial approval . . . to [acquire] evidence
concerning a person who is represented by the attorney/witness." ' 19
Although the advocate-witness rule is a powerful weapon for the
prosecutor, it may be less so for the defense.420
The prosecutor and his deputies have no financial interest in the
outcome of criminal prosecutions; they have a duty to seek jus-
tice, not merely to convict; and they must disclose to the defense
counsel any evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the de-
fendant, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the
punishment.42
416. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frank Coluccio Constr. Co., 785 F.2d 656, 658-59 (9th Cir.
1986).
417. United States v. Siegner, 498 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Though this
court expressly mentioned conflict of interest only in this context, the court also expressed
concern with confidentiality and the advocate-witness rule. The same rationale by the court
should also apply to either of these ethical issues.
418. Suni, supra note 381, at 236. The author quoted the New York Times, in an edito-
rial entitled "Lawyers and the Mob," as stating, "The power to subpoena lawyers, creating a
conflict that may force them to withdraw from a case, is at least potentially a prosecution
power to disarm the defense." Id. at 221 n.21. [The author provides no further information on
this article's location].
419. 54 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2414, 2415 (Feb. 18, 1986). See Note, supra note 16, at 1382
n.108 (The author showed that, as of 1977, the Justice Department had a policy of "demand-
ing disqualification if the need for counsel's testimony could have been anticipated from the
start of the litigation." The Internal Revenue Service, at that same time, followed a policy of
informing the court and opposing counsel in this situation, but refused to make the motion to
disqualify. The IRS apparently felt that "the trial stage [was] an inappropriate time to allege
a violation of the Disciplinary Rules .... ) This conflict among federal agencies in address-
ing the attorney-witness situation illustrates that the issue is clearly not one for the courts, and
that the rule represents no universal principal that demands judicial enforcement.
420. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:508 (Apr. 14, 1984) ("Some courts
...have refused to apply the rule to disqualify the staff of a prosecutor's office. ... )
421. Id. at 61:511. See also Baker v. Leahy, 633 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1985), stating
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The advocate-witness rule as currently applied favors the prosecu-
tion.422 This advantage unnecessarily tips the scales of justice.
5. Court Responses to Tactical Use of the Rule.-Courts ap-
ply the advocate-witness rule even if tactical reasons motivated the
motion to disqualify. In one case, the matters to which the attorney
allegedly would testify had been witnessed by others, and were only
hearsay on a collateral issue. The attorney assured the court that his
testimony was unnecessary, but offered to withdraw if discovery
proved otherwise. This court rigidly applied the rule and disqualified
the attorney, stating that it could not "say with any degree of secur-
ity or in good conscience that [the attorney] will not be called as a
witness."" 23
Though the majority of courts may follow a similar approach in
applying the advocate-witness rule, some have tried to reduce its tac-
tical value. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that
the opposing counsel's motive for the motion was to force the poten-
tial advocate-witness to withhold damaging evidence that might
make that advocate's testimony necessary and thus force his with-
drawal. 24 The court balked at the prospect of applying the advocate-
witness rule so broadly as to "grant disqualification whenever coun-
sel threatens to call opposing counsel," '425 and decided that, because
"of this potential abuse, disqualification motions should be subjected
to 'particularly strict judicial scrutiny.' "420
that the
witness who is a government attorney does not have a financial interest in the
outcome of litigation conducted by an affiliated attorney as does a witness who is
an attorney in a private firm. This lack of financial interest justifies a narrow
construction of the rule in cases where no prejudice is shown.
Id. at 765. In a perfect world, prosecutors would not care about career advancement, public
adulation, reelection, or victory. As long as prosecutors are human beings, however, isolating
money as the reason a lawyer might abuse the dual role of advocate and witness, and then
applying a stricter advocate-witness rule to fee earning attorneys, is naive and unjust.
422. In Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 260 (1984), the Supreme Court held
that denial of defense counsel, because of apparent conflict, was not immediately appealable as
a collateral order. This ruling is consistent with the civil action rule, see supra note 410; how-
ever, it serves to increase the impact of the prosecutor's disqualification power in criminal
cases.
423. Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 906, 912, 576 P.2d 971, 973 (1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
424. Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int'l v. Style Cos., 760 F.2d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 1985)
(the opposing attorneys had obtained statistics for use at trial by mailing a questionnaire to
many of their client's customers).
425. Id. at 1050.
426. Id. (quoting Rice v. Baren, 456 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). See also
Dalrymple v. National Bank & Trust Co. of Traverse City, 615 F. Supp. 979, 983-84 (W.D.
Mich. 1985) (The court found that the substance of the attorney's testimony "would not be
crucial or necessary."); Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 610 F. Supp. 1319, 1323
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6. Client Consent as a Solution to Tactical Use.-Client con-
sent cannot cure all the problems associated with the advocate-wit-
ness rule."27 To the extent that courts allow the advocate and his
client to decide to continue the representation and to testify, the tac-
tical abuse problem will be eliminated. 428 "The result is that the re-
sponsibility for the tactical conduct of each attorney's case remains
where it properly belongs-with the litigant and the counsel of his
choice, not with the opposition. 429
The tactical uses of the advocate-witness rule are only possible
when such a rule is enforced by the courts. A better solution would
be to let the bar address attorneys who violate the rule.
D. Calling Opposing Counsel
1. Standards for Calling Opposing Counsel.-There are times
when a party wants to call the opposition's lawyer as a witness. This
situation is not the same as when the opposing party moves for dis-
qualification because the opposing advocate ought to be a witness.
One court stated that being called to testify by the opposing counsel
"is a compliment [because it] present[s] him to the jury as worthy of
their confidence in spite of conflicting interests. 4
°3 0
Most courts closely scrutinize this situation. 3 ' One test to de-
(D. Del. 1985) (quoting J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Gurfein, J. concurring)) (Disqualification motions demand strict "judicial scrutiny to prevent
literalism from overcoming substantial justice to the parties."), affd, 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.
1985); Sutton, supra note 22, at 485 ("[l1t would be a dangerous doctrine which would permit
one party to eject the opposition's advocate from the case simply by calling upon him to
testify.").
427. See supra notes 390-99 and accompanying text for the effects of the rule on attor-
ney-client relationships. Nor is client consent the only proposed solution. See Comment, supra
note 21, at 134 ("This withdrawal requirement, however, would be a wicked sword in the
hands of an attorney who wished to force opposing counsel from the trial.") The author goes
on to propose that suppressing such testimony resolves the issue. Actually, the issue remains
live, because the client and the attorney are still faced with the decision whether to retain the
evidence or the representation. At least they have some choice. A better solution, however,
assuming the advocate-witness rule must exist at all, would permit the client to consent to his
counsel's performance in both roles.
428. See Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 623 (Consent "should eliminate the use of
the rule as a tactical weapon; it should also reduce the enormous costs of the rule, both direct
and indirect, not only in the planning stages of a transaction, but in all stages of the litiga-
tion."); Wydick, supra, note 22, at 666 (The lawyer and his client are in the best position to
decide how to proceed. "This approach ... minimizes the chances that the adversary will be
able to use a disqualification motion to deprive the client of chosen trial counsel."). Cf.
Cramer, supra note 127, at 829 ("[T]o the extent that courts allow the attorney and client to
decide whether the attorney should testify and withdraw or continue the representation
429. Cramer, supra note 127, at 827.
430. Maine v. Rittenmeyer, 169 Iowa 675, 678, 151 N.W. 499, 500 (1915).
431. One reason for such close scrutiny is the possibility of severe damage to the client's
case that might occur if the opposing counsel could somehow present to the jury a rift between
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termine whether the testifying attorney should withdraw is whether
the testimony will be "crucial or necessary. 4 32 Another standard re-
quires that the evidence the opposing counsel will offer be "necessary
and unobtainable from other sources." ' a When the subpoena is for a
government prosecutor, one test applied is whether the testimony is
"unavoidably necessary" because "all other sources of possible testi-
mony have been exhausted. 434 A similar test applies when the pros-
ecutor desires to call the defense counsel.435
These standards parallel those a court might apply under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 403.436 To apply such standards each time an
opposing advocate calls his counterpart to testify is to deny the call-
ing attorney the right to plan his own case, subject to applicable
evidentiary concerns. A trial advocate decides which witnesses he
needs to prove his case. If the court should find some of these wit-
nesses cumulative, the advocate, not the court, should determine
which of the cumulative witnesses he will use.
2. A Hypothetical Shows That the Rule is Superflu-
ous.-Assume a rape victim is in the prosecutor's office telling her
story to the prosecutor. Also present is the prosecutor's secretary, an
obnoxious man, who is known as a forgetful gossip, prone to exag-
geration, and who is hard of hearing.43 7 The victim tells the prosecu-
tor she is unable to identify her assailant because it was dark, he
wore a mask, and she was too frightened to look at him. Later, after
psychiatric assistance, the rape victim views a lineup and identifies
the defendant. Forensic testing neither incriminates nor exculpates
attorney and client. See supra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
432. Dalrymple v. National Bank & Trust Co. of Traverse City, 615 F. Supp. 979, 983-
84 (W.D, Mich. 1985).
433. United States v. Crockett, 506 F.2d 759, 760 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824
(1975).
434. United States v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1974). See also United
States v. West, 680 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Trapnell, 638 F.2d 1016,
1025 (7th Cir. 1980).
435. See. e.g., Crockett, 506 F.2d at 760; United States v. Fiorillo, 376 F.2d 180, 185
(2d Cir. 1967).
436. See supra note 119. Such redundancy is doubled when courts are willing to apply
their inherent power to obtain similar results. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
437. The secretary is present in part to prevent later advocate-witness rule problems.
See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecutorial
Function and the Defense Function, The Prosecution Function, § 4.3(d) (Approved Draft
1971), which stated:
The prosecutor should avoid interviewing a prospective witness except in the
presence of a third person unless the prosecutor is prepared to forego impeach-
ment of a witness by the prosecutor's own testimony as to what the witness
stated in an interview or to seek leave to withdraw from the case in order to
present his impeaching testimony.
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1990
the accused. Prior to trial, the prosecutor discloses the prior inconsis-
tent statements the victim made in his office. At trial, the victim
testifies that she could never forget the man who raped her. Time
stood still. His mask slipped down. The moon was full, and passing
car lights illuminated his leering countenance.
To impeach the victim, the defense counsel seeks to call the
prosecutor.4 38 He explains to the court that the prosecutor is by far
the more credible of the available witnesses to the victim's earlier
statements. The prosecutor objects, claiming that, because his secre-
tary is available as a witness, he need not testify.
Assume further that the defense counsel moved to disqualify the
prosecutor as trial counsel under the advocate-witness rule.43 The
cumulative witness standard as applied in most jurisdictions44 ° would
force the defense to rely on the poor impeachment witness, the secre-
tary. The prosecutor need not make the objection he really has,
which is that impeachment from the prosecutor's own mouth is sub-
stantially more unfairly prejudicial than probative of the victim's
lack of truthfulness. He would argue that his proposed testimony
would show a lack of faith in the victim instead of merely recounting
her statements in his office. The secretary can recount the words the
victim spoke just as accurately as the prosecutor, but far less
prejudicially.
Even if the advocate-witness rule did not apply, the court could
reach the same result. In addition to his Federal Rule of Evidence
403 objection, a confident prosecutor could offer to stipulate in fact
as to what the victim said, or he could offer to limit his cross-exami-
438. The defense counsel should carefully consider this decision because he may be ex-
posing his client to a well-constructed closing argument by the prosecutor, or his replacement,
if the judge forces his withdrawal. Such an argument might begin: "She was truthful in my
office; she couldn't remember, and that embarrassed her so she made excuses. Now, after
extensive and painful therapy, she can force herself to tell you exactly what happened. Al-
though she knew she would be called a liar by the accused, she was willing to suffer that cruel
indignity to make sure this terrible fate befalls no other innocent young women in this commu-
nity ....
439. Whether the defense counsel moved to disqualify or not may change the result. See
Comment, supra note 21, at 133-34. (As of 1970, no case reported a counsel being disqualified
when called by the opposing party to testify. "Since Rule 19 of the Canon of Ethics requires
an attorney to withdraw from a case when he testifies for his client and not when he testifies
against his client, these cases do not appear to violate the rule."); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 339, at 4 (1975) ("No disciplinary rule requires the
withdrawal of a lawyer who, at trial, is called as a witness by an. opposing party if the lawyer
had no previous knowledge or reasonable basis for believing that he ought to be called by that
party." The opinion vacillates a few sentences later. "[W]e are not prepared to hold [testifying
adverse to the client's interests] would never be ethically permissible, but we note that with
such employment the lawyer also accepts a heavy responsibility.").
440. See supra notes 431-35 and accompanying text.
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nation of the secretary, as appropriate.
The prosecutor has an excellent chance of avoiding the witness
stand with these evidentiary objections and testimonial substitutes.
He need not rely upon the advocate-witness rule. Courts frown upon
the practice of calling opposing counsel "because of the possibility of
delay tactics by unscrupulous counsel" and because courts seek "the
fairest and most equitable result.""' Courts are quite properly con-
cerned with the implications of this practice upon the attorney-client
privilege and the right to counsel. 4 2 They fear that calling the op-
posing counsel will impugn the integrity of the judicial process.
4 43
With the generally disapproving attitude courts have toward the
practice of one attorney calling his counterpart to the witness stand,
evidentiary techniques could generate the same result as the advo-
cate-witness rule in a fashion carefully tailored to the needs of each
case.4 4 Existing evidentiary techniques impose no arbitrary barriers
to the testimony of any witness with knowledge of a material fact
relevant to the case. They are preferable to a superfluous and arbi-
trary application of the advocate-witness rule.
E. Factors Underlying Disqualification
I. Generally.-Courts and commentators addressing the issue
of attorney disqualification often identify factors they believe are rel-
evant, but there is no single list of such factors that courts and attor-
neys can rely upon to guide their conduct in the area of the advo-
cate-witness rule. A good rule would identify "the clearly relevant
factors, in order that lawyers and judges, making necessarily hasty
decisions amid the pressures of litigation, may rely upon [the rule]
as a proper guide to professional responsibility."" 5
The factors that courts and commentators have proposed vary
widely. The reasons for disqualifying a counsel in a given case usu-
ally follow the rationales for the rule, though it is unusual for a court
441. Note, supra note 91, at 807.
442. Gunther v. United States, 230 F.2d 222, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
443. MacArthur v. Bank of N.Y., 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
444. This hypothetical intentionally examined the most difficult case, because the crimi-
nal defendant has compulsory process rights making denial of any witness he requests a sensi-
tive issue. An aggressive defense counsel could avail himself of the court's equity powers to
insist that the prosecutor withdraw before testifying, even if the prosecutor was willing to take
the stand. Prosecutors make dangerously credible witnesses in the same cases in which they
are trial counsel, and cross-examination could devastate the defense. See supra notes 267-68
and accompanying text. Justice may require the judge to duplicate precisely the advocate-
witness rule result: withdraw and testify. In civil trial situations, the judge's broad equity pow-
ers should reach this result more easily.
445. Sutton, supra note 22, at 498.
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or an author to cite more than three of these rationales in any one
case or article. 4 6
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct seek to supply a clear
list of factors through the comment to Rule 3.7, which Professor
Wydick summarizes as:
(1) The nature of the case.
(2) The importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's
testimony.
(3) The probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict
with that of other witnesses.
(4) The foreseeability to both parties that the lawyer would
have to testify.
(5) The effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. 47
Professor Wydick would add a sixth factor: "Who will be the trier of
fact? ' 448 His proposal rests on the idea that a judge is sufficiently
able to avoid the potential pitfalls of attorney testimony. Protecting a
judge through application of the advocate-witness rule is not as nec-
essary as protecting a jury. With the exception of Professor
Wydick's suggestion, each of these factors is subjective, and the list
does not weight the factors. Furthermore, many of the factors are
vague, such as "the nature of the case." This Model Rules list of
factors should at least lead courts to consider these factors in each
case, and perhaps through repeated litigation the more nebulous con-
cepts in those considerations will acquire more precise meanings.
Objective factors would be more useful to obtain uniform appli-
cation of the rule and to allow appropriate preventive measures by
attorneys facing an advocate-witness situation. In addition to the
identity of the trier of fact, such a list might include the timing of
446. See, e.g., United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110, 117-18 (C.M.A. 1988) (Other
sources of testimony and impeachability of advocate-witness (protect the client), opposing
counsel allowed full cross-examination (protect opposing party), and protect the testifying ad-
vocate from arguing his own credibility, motion out of the jury's presence (protect the system
and the profession). Baca is the one case that considered many factors in making its decision.).
See also Cramer, supra note 127, at 828 (no significant detriment to the opponent and no taint
of the legal system); Note, supra note 91, at 802 n.48 (considering prejudice to the opposing
party, availability of the evidence through other sources, protection of the client, and obtaining
justice).
447. Wydick, supra note 22, at 693.
448. Id. The idea of differentiating between judge and jury as factfinder also appears in
court opinions. See, e.g., Duncan v. Poythress, 750 F.2d 1540, 1546 n.18 (11th Cir.), vacated,
756 F.2d 1481 (1985). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rendered essentially the
same decision as the vacated opinion, en banc, in Duncan v. Poythfess, 777 F.2d 1508 (11 th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986). The difference between judge and jury is the
second of a list of factors that courts often do not consider. Note, supra note 91, at 1366
(compiling cases).
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the motion, the length of the attorney-client relationship, the nature
and extent of the attorney's involvement in the litigation, the ability
of the client to obtain substitute counsel, the extent of the attorney's
interest in the litigation's outcome, and the circumstances that made
the advocate a potential witness.' 9
To this list could be added whether the testimony was on the
merits of the case or merely on a procedural issue; whether the advo-
cate-witness counsel had offered fair testimonial substitutes, which
the opposing counsel refused; whether the opposing counsel had of-
fered fair testimonial substitutes, which the advocate-witness had re-
fused; whether the testimony covered factual matters or would also
allow the advocate-witness to interject opinion; whether a co-counsel
will perform the direct examination as opposed to some sort of nar-
rative by the advocate-witness, 50 and whether, in the criminal con-
text, the defense counsel or the prosecutor wants to testify.
2. The Non-jury Situation.-Of all of these factors, if the tes-
timony would be before a judge, then that fact alone may well de-
serve controlling weight in determining whether or not to invoke the
advocate-witness rule. A judge is unlikely to be confused or misled
by an attorney filling both the advocate and witness roles in the same
case.4 51 When a judge is the factfinder, "there [is] no danger that
the trier-of-fact [can] not distinguish between testimony and advo-
cacy." 52 The Court of Military Appeals found the fact that the at-
torney testimony would be "out of the [jury's] presence" a factor in
concluding that "neither the defense nor the prosecution would have
been disadvantaged" by the advocate testifying in response to ques-
tions from his co-counsel.' 55 Another court found that the fear that
an advocate who also testified would be too persuasive, and therefore
449. Note, supra note 16, at 1366.
450. In United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110, 118 (C.M.A. 1988), the defense proceeded
on a pretrial issue by letting the assistant defense counsel litigate the motion, while the lead
counsel testified in support of that motion. The court approved this technique as fair to the
prosecution and as protecting the lead defense counsel from "the unseemly and ineffective
position of arguing his own credibility." See Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
61:507 (Apr. 14, 1984) (Rule 3.7(a) would not prevent a witness-lawyer from associating with
another lawyer who would act as trial counsel.); see also Note, supra note 16, at 1389 (An
assistant counsel would avoid the need for counsel to perform "a vaudevillian routine to ques-
tion himself upon the stand." The author cites Woody Allen's Bananas in support of the di-
lemma of a lawyer performing his own direct examination.). But see Sutton, supra note 22, at
488 n.39 (noting that the "mere presence of co-counsel does not solve the problem," because
co-counsel may be unable to perform the trial counsel's duties.).
451. Wydick, supra note 22, at 693-94.
452. Duncan, 750 F.2d at 1546.
453. Baca, 27 M.J. at 118.
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unfair to the opposing party, was not relevant to a nonjury trial."54
When there is no jury, the need to protect the profession's reputation
from public criticism loses much if not all of its force.455 The experi-
ence of the trial judge can protect the client from any undue im-
peachment weight associated with the witness's status as trial coun-
sel in the case." 6
Testimony before a judge could arise in two ways. First, the
trial judge could be the trier of fact and the attorney's testimony
would be on the merits of the case. Second, in a jury trial, the issue
on which the attorney would testify could be collateral or procedural,
in which case the judge alone would hear the testimony and rule
accordingly out of the jury's presence. In this second instance, there
seems to be no good reason to support applying the advocate-witness
rule, absent unusual circumstances. As the Court of Military Ap-
peals stated: "In some situations, a lawyer may find it necessary to
testify. When it is on a procedural, administrative, or collateral mat-
ter, he or she ordinarily need not be disqualified as counsel. 457
In any list of factors providing guidance as to situations in
which the advocate-witness rule should apply, the absence of the
public in the form of the trier of fact should be controlling, absent
extraordinary circumstances.
F. Courts Enforcing an Ethical Rule
Evidentiary rules are not the same as ethical rules. Courts rou-
tinely decide evidentiary questions, and such decisions are a part of
every trial. There is a set of evidence rules and, generally, an exten-
sive body of law defining each of these rules. Ethical matters, on the
other hand, rarely arise at trial. Courts usually leave ethical matters
to the bar. The advocate-witness rule is unusual; even though it has
no evidentiary counterpart, courts apply it persistently.
The main reason that some courts avoid enforcing ethical rules
against a testifying advocate is that "it would be unfair to penalize
the client for an ethical violation committed by his attorney."4 58 Al-
though a client must suffer if his attorney errs on a matter of sub-
stantive or procedural law, for example by allowing a statute of limi-
tations to run, courts should not jeopardize the client's interests in
454.' Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp.
1348, 1354 (D. Colo. 1976).
455. Note, supra note 16, at 1390.
456. Id. at 1395.
457. United States v. Cook, 27 M.J. 212, 214 n.3 (C.M.A. 1988).
458. Note, supra note 31, at 299.
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order to discipline the attorney for an ethical violation of the advo-
cate-witness rule. 59
In addition to harming the client when his offending counsel is
punished, courts that apply the advocate-witness rule also affect the
lawyer, the judicial system, and the local bar. When a court takes
adverse action toward an attorney, and therefore his client, for an
apparent violation of this ethical standard, it does so without the
benefit of "the full opportunity afforded by a hearing to ascertain
whether under the facts" the attorney violated the rule."' ° "A law-
yer, like all other citizens, has a civic duty to testify regarding rele-
vant, unprivileged facts which will aid the court in arriving at a
proper judgment."" 1 If he has breached an ethical duty by remain-
ing as trial counsel while providing such testimony, it should be the
bar's responsibility to take any adverse action required."62
Conflict of interest situations are distinct from advocate-witness
situations, because the lawyer's former client cannot protect himself.
In conflict situations, the court must prevent a lawyer from ignoring
the confidentiality rights of a former client while he represents his
current client. In a conflict situation, the opposing party receives
only an incidental benefit. When the attorney violates the advocate-
witness rule, however, judicial enforcement directly benefits the op-
posing party at the expense of the client, who is supposedly one of
the beneficiaries of the rule. 6 A bar disciplinary hearing provides
some due process. The attorney accused of unethical conduct should
find his actions more fairly and completely examined in this forum.
Another advantage of resolving the alleged ethical violation at a bar
disciplinary hearing, rather than at trial, is that the attorney, not the
client, bears the costs and the consequences.464
V. Conclusion
Ideally, a rule proscribing activities as important as testifying in
court and representing a client's interests at trial would not be sub-
ject to any misunderstanding, and would have a long and distin-
459. Comment, supra note 21, at 144.
460. Sutton, supra note 22, at 495-96. See Brown & Brown, supra note 45, at 622.
461. Sutton, supra note 22, at 483-84. See Note, supra note 16, at 1373 n.40 ("An
attorney need not be disqualified automatically because he has first-hand knowledge about the
subject matter of a lawsuit.").
462. See Sutton, supra note 22, at 497 ("But in general, diligent use of the regular
disciplinary machinery is the most satisfactory way to curtail improper conduct by the testify-
ing advocate.").
463. Id.
464. Brown & Brown, supra note 415, at 622.
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guished history. The rationales behind this rule would be so clear
that their validity would brook no dispute. Problems applying such a
rule would be few, and it would not offer itself as a weapon to one
party while looming as a liability to his opponent. Ultimately, there
would be little doubt that the ends obtained through such a rule jus-
tified the costs associated with its application.
The advocate-witness rule, codified or not, in no way meets this
definition of ideal. Its history is relatively short and of checkered
origin. The rationales allegedly supporting the rule are many, al-
though each offered rationale has detractors with persuasive argu-
ments arrayed against it. The current version of the rule cites two
principal supporting rationales,6 5 but commentators have rejected
both repeatedly. Furthermore, the rule has no unassailed historical
foundation on which to base the significant impact it has on
litigation.
Also far from ideal are the definitional problems courts have
encountered in applying the rule. The absence of a definite rule
makes the judge's role unclear. The rule lends itself to tactical use
by any party who cares to raise the motion. In many cases, a motion
to disqualify counsel under this rule adversely affects the advocate-
witness's preparation for trial, whether or not it ultimately forces
that lawyer from the case.
The advocate-witness rule's costs are very high. It impedes the
client's right to select his counsel, as well as his relationship with
that counsel. A judicial process encumbered by the rule consumes
more of the client's and the court's resources. The trier of fact may
be deprived of competent, relevant evidence. The very existence of
the rule insinuates that lawyers cannot be trusted; as such, it argua-
bly libels the entire profession.
The rule's principal benefits to the judicial system are preven-
tion of a systemic breakdown through confusion of the trier of fact
and preclusion of unduly weighted argument or testimony by the ad-
vocate witness. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and the court's super-
visory power would achieve this same result when the probative
value of advocate-witness evidence is substantially and unfairly out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect.4 6
The rule's proponents argue that it benefits the client by pro-
tecting him from himself, an unscrupulous attorney, and an advocate
rendered ineffective because he fills two roles. Far better alternatives
465. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.7 comment (1984).
466. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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are available. A client wronged by his attorney has remedies, such as
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that can make him whole
should justice require that result. The judicial system allows the cli-
ent to consent to and thereby control many aspects of the trying of
his case; he may even choose to surrender many of his constitutional
rights by pleading guilty. Through informed consent, the client
should similarly be able to waive those aspects of the advocate-wit-
ness rule allegedly benefitting him. The client does not need the pro-
tection of an advocate-witness rule that does not permit informed
consent, if he needs such a rule at all.
The rule also purportedly serves to protect the profession from
adverse public opinion. Bar associations, not courts, can and should
discipline members who behave unprofessionally. Offering relevant
and admissible testimony is neither unethical nor unprofessional.
Only if advocate testimony violates an evidentiary rule, not the advo-
cate-witness rule, should courts take measures to prevent it. Only if
the attorney's testimony violates an ethical rule, other than the advo-
cate-witness rule, should bar associations take measures to punish
him.
The price of the rule is dear. The minimal benefits of the rule
are available through other well established and less costly means.
The advocate-witness rule should be abolished, and the hazards of
advocate testimony should be handled through these alternative
procedures.

